Comment on David Glasner on ‘The Well-Defined, but Nearly Useless, Natural Rate of Interest’
Blog-Reference
Keynes had a great methodological insight: “In 1933, Keynes wrote a short contribution to a Festschrift for the German economist Arthur Spiethoff. He there attacked classical economists for not providing an adequate monetary theory. He then embarked upon the development of what he termed a monetary theory of production, a theory in which the interdependence of money and uncertainty, and their effects on economic behavior, could be properly investigated.” (Fontana, 2000, p. 40)
Keynes’ insight has been that the proper subject matter of economics is the monetary economy. Many economists have not got this point until today but still maintain that the ‘real’ economy is the real economy. It is definitively not.
And for one simple reason: the phenomenon of profit cannot appear at all in a ‘real’ economy (2011b). Because of this all ‘real’ models miss the essence of the market economy and are a priori worthless. This includes approaches like Ricardo, Sraffa, or RBC. This is Keynes’ lasting contribution to the advancement of theoretical economics: all ‘real’ models have to go out of the window because they are deeply and irreparably flawed.
The real-world economy manifests itself in the interaction of real and nominal variables. Because of this, the theory of saving, investment, and interest have to be developed within the framework of what Keynes called the ‘monetary theory of production’.
The real time travel, i.e. inventory accumulation/decumulation, is entirely disconnected from nominal time travel, i.e. saving/dissaving (2013). The same holds for capital accumulation/decumulation and saving/dissaving. And, most important of all, saving/dissaving is intimately connected with loss/profit. This connection is obviously important, yet it is entirely missing in the familiar theories of interest.
The crucial point is that the representative economist needs to understand what profit is (2011a). Because of this, the theory of interest is false by implication. The worst blunder consists of conceptualizing the natural rate as a real magnitude and in the futile attempt to derive interest from an apples-now-apples-later time preference model.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Fontana, G. (2000). Post Keynesians and Circuitists on Money and Uncertainty: An Attempt at Generality. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 23(1): 27–48. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011a). The Emergence of Profit and Interest in the Monetary
Circuit. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1973952: 1–22. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011b). When Ricardo Saw Profit, He Called it Rent: On the Vice of Parochial Realism. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1932119: 1–19. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Settling the Theory of Saving. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2220651: 1–23. URL
Related 'Debunking the natural rate of interest' and 'Are economists methodological retards?'.
This blog connects to the AXEC Project which applies a superior method of economic analysis. The following comments have been posted on selected blogs as catalysts for the ongoing Paradigm Shift. The comments are brought together here for information. The full debates are directly accessible via the Blog-References. Scrap the lot and start again―that is what a Paradigm Shift is all about. Time to make economics a science.
November 9, 2015
November 7, 2015
No trade-off, Kant said
Comment on Lars Syll on ‘The most devastatingly important trade-off in mainstream economics’
Blog-Reference
“Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31)
Repeat: formal and material consistency, both! There is no trade-off in science, never was, and never will be. The misleading idea that there could be a conflict between ‘theory and practice’ or ‘rigor and relevance’ is very old and immensely popular among laypersons. So much so that Kant bothered to refute it in an essay, first published in 1793, with the title ‘On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won’t Work in Practice.’
Kant exploded the silly saw with the famous punch-line: “Es gibt nichts Praktischeres als eine gute Theorie“ or “There is nothing as practical as a good theory.”
Hence, Lars Syll’s summary: “the higher the level of rigour and precision, the smaller is the range of real-world application. So the more mainstream economists insist on formal logic validity, the less they have to say about the real world” has already been refuted in 1793.
The devastating crux of Orthodoxy stems not from formal logic validity but from the set of absolutely unacceptable premises. The intellectual catastrophe that is economics starts with the maximization-with-equilibrium assumption, which is common to the sorta-kinda funny crowd of spacy DSGEers.
As soon as Heterodoxy agrees on superior axioms Orthodoxy’s conceptual green cheese will be gone for good. Heterodoxy will outperform Orthodoxy in logical consistency “... for he who contradicts himself proves nothing.” (Klant, 1988, p. 113)
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Klant, J. J. (1988). The Natural Order. In N. de Marchi (Ed.), The Popperian Legacy in Economics, 87–117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Blog-Reference
“Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31)
Repeat: formal and material consistency, both! There is no trade-off in science, never was, and never will be. The misleading idea that there could be a conflict between ‘theory and practice’ or ‘rigor and relevance’ is very old and immensely popular among laypersons. So much so that Kant bothered to refute it in an essay, first published in 1793, with the title ‘On the Old Saw: That May Be Right in Theory But It Won’t Work in Practice.’
Kant exploded the silly saw with the famous punch-line: “Es gibt nichts Praktischeres als eine gute Theorie“ or “There is nothing as practical as a good theory.”
Hence, Lars Syll’s summary: “the higher the level of rigour and precision, the smaller is the range of real-world application. So the more mainstream economists insist on formal logic validity, the less they have to say about the real world” has already been refuted in 1793.
The devastating crux of Orthodoxy stems not from formal logic validity but from the set of absolutely unacceptable premises. The intellectual catastrophe that is economics starts with the maximization-with-equilibrium assumption, which is common to the sorta-kinda funny crowd of spacy DSGEers.
As soon as Heterodoxy agrees on superior axioms Orthodoxy’s conceptual green cheese will be gone for good. Heterodoxy will outperform Orthodoxy in logical consistency “... for he who contradicts himself proves nothing.” (Klant, 1988, p. 113)
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Klant, J. J. (1988). The Natural Order. In N. de Marchi (Ed.), The Popperian Legacy in Economics, 87–117. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Debunking the natural rate of interest
Comment on David Glasner on ‘The Well-Defined, but Nearly Useless, Natural Rate of Interest’
Blog-Reference
Wicksell has always been well aware of the fact that economists are confused confusers “... when it is a matter of finding the cause of general changes in the price of commodities, and especially the influence on those of credit and the institutions regulating credit, some maintain that cheap and easy credit, in other words, a low rate of interest, will tend to increase the amount of means of payment in circulation and the demand for goods and this will tend to increase the general level of prices; while others maintain the contrary, that cheap credit means the same things as cheaper costs of production and so tends to lower the level of prices, not to raise it; and naturally ... there is no lack of more moderate opinion between the two extremes, eclectics who say that the influence of credit on prices is sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another and is sometimes nil.” (cited in Deane, 1983, p. 8, see also 2013).
It can even be said that economic analysis consists essentially of kicking any problem around in the realm between true and false, where, as Keynes said, “... nothing is clear and everything is possible” (1973, p. 292), without ever arriving at a final true/false conclusion. Hicks is exemplary for how to deal with manifest contradictions: “As far as I can make out, there are relevant and important senses in which all these statements are each of them right and each of them wrong.” (1939, p. 184)
Inconclusiveness is the outstanding characteristic of political economics. Theoretical economics is different; it aims at clear-cut answers. This presupposes that the formal apparatus of analysis is consistent. “The highest ambition an economist can entertain who believes in the scientific character of economics would be fulfilled as soon as he succeeded in constructing a simple model displaying all the essential features of the economic process by means of a reasonably small number of equations connecting a reasonably small number of variables.” (Schumpeter, 1946, p. 3)
Standard economics never got close to this ‘simple model’. Roughly speaking, the two main approaches, the Walrasian and the Keynesian, are both defective, that is, they cannot explain how the monetary economy works (2015). The ultimate reason is that standard economics is not built upon a set of acceptable premises or axioms. Walrasianism is based on the concepts of constrained optimization and equilibrium. Both premises are methodologically unacceptable.
So, what does the correct ‘little apparatus’ look like? Generally speaking, it is based upon a set of axioms that do not contain any Walrasian or Keynesian propositions. The replacement of obsolete premises amounts to a Paradigm Shift.
As a matter of principle, the analysis must always start with the most elementary case. This is the pure consumption economy. The theory of interest has to be developed out of the objectively given properties of the most elementary economic configuration. That is, to begin with, there are two firms; one produces the consumption good and the other money/credit. This firm is called the Central Bank, and it stands for the banking industry as a whole. For a start, only the household sector takes up credit. There is no investment in the pure consumption economy, and by consequence, no investment financing.
Under the objective condition of zero profit in both firms, we have Pc=Wc/Rc, the price of the consumption good is equal to unit wage costs, and ra=Wb/Rb, ditto for the rate of interest on the asset side of the Central Bank's balance sheet. If wage rates are set equal for simplicity, then we have ra/Pc=Rc/Rb, that is, the real interest rate is objectively determined by the production conditions in both industries. This is the point of departure of the objective Theory of Interest.
In the investment economy, things are a bit more complex. Normally, the household sector is the lender and the business sector is the borrower. Accordingly, one has two rates of interest ra and rl. The interest rate on the asset side of the Central Bank's balance sheet ra denotes what the business has to pay; the interest rate on the liability side rl denotes what the household sector is paid. Under the zero-profit condition, there is a fixed relationship between the two rates. The Central Bank, though, is in principle free to set any configuration of ra and rl. A very interesting limiting case is rl=0.
The Employment Law for the investment economy is shown on Graphic AXEC62a
From this equation follows inter alia:
(i) An increase in the expenditure ratio ρE leads to higher employment.
(ii) Increasing investment expenditures I exert a positive influence on employment.
(iii) An increase in the factor cost ratio ρF=W/PR leads to higher employment. This implies that an increase in the average wage rate W relative to price P and productivity R leads to higher employment (2015).
What remains to be done is to establish how the expenditure ratio depends on the deposit rate ρE=f(rl) and how investment depends on the lending rate I=f(ra). These two functions inserted into the Employment Law give the general relationship between employment, prices, and the two interest rates.
Conclusion: If the functional relations f(rl) and f(ra) are reliable and if the price mechanism works such that ρE is roughly constant, then the Central Bank is in the position to establish full employment by fine-tuning the two interest rates. By implication, if there is no reliable relationship, there is no lever for interest rate policy.
Wicksell’s natural-rate mechanism implies the equalization of saving and investment (Blaug, 1998, p. 621). It has already been shown in previous posts that this equality/ equilibrium NEVER occurs, neither ex-ante nor ex-post. And this, in turn, means that the concept of the natural rate has been fallacious from the start.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Blaug, M. (1998). Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition.
Deane, P. (1983). The Scope and Method of Economic Science. Economic Journal, 93(369): 1–12. URL
Hicks, J. R. (1939). Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edition.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Confused Confusers: How to Stop Thinking Like an Economist and Start Thinking Like a Scientist. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2207598: 1–16. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1946). The Decade of the Twenties. American Economic Review, 36(2): 1–10. URL
Related 'Macroeconomics: Drain the scientific swamp' and 'From false microfoundations to true macrofoundations (II)' and 'The canonical macroeconomic model' and 'Are economists methodological retards? and 'Down and out' and 'Humpty Dumpty is back again' and 'Accounting basics' and 'I=S: Mark of the Incompetent' and 'Interest and profit' and 'End of confusion' and 'Keynes and the logical brilliance of Bedlam'. For more details of the big picture, see cross-references Keynesianism.
Related 'The irreparable unreality of all ‘real’ models'
Blog-Reference
Wicksell has always been well aware of the fact that economists are confused confusers “... when it is a matter of finding the cause of general changes in the price of commodities, and especially the influence on those of credit and the institutions regulating credit, some maintain that cheap and easy credit, in other words, a low rate of interest, will tend to increase the amount of means of payment in circulation and the demand for goods and this will tend to increase the general level of prices; while others maintain the contrary, that cheap credit means the same things as cheaper costs of production and so tends to lower the level of prices, not to raise it; and naturally ... there is no lack of more moderate opinion between the two extremes, eclectics who say that the influence of credit on prices is sometimes in one direction, sometimes in another and is sometimes nil.” (cited in Deane, 1983, p. 8, see also 2013).
It can even be said that economic analysis consists essentially of kicking any problem around in the realm between true and false, where, as Keynes said, “... nothing is clear and everything is possible” (1973, p. 292), without ever arriving at a final true/false conclusion. Hicks is exemplary for how to deal with manifest contradictions: “As far as I can make out, there are relevant and important senses in which all these statements are each of them right and each of them wrong.” (1939, p. 184)
Inconclusiveness is the outstanding characteristic of political economics. Theoretical economics is different; it aims at clear-cut answers. This presupposes that the formal apparatus of analysis is consistent. “The highest ambition an economist can entertain who believes in the scientific character of economics would be fulfilled as soon as he succeeded in constructing a simple model displaying all the essential features of the economic process by means of a reasonably small number of equations connecting a reasonably small number of variables.” (Schumpeter, 1946, p. 3)
Standard economics never got close to this ‘simple model’. Roughly speaking, the two main approaches, the Walrasian and the Keynesian, are both defective, that is, they cannot explain how the monetary economy works (2015). The ultimate reason is that standard economics is not built upon a set of acceptable premises or axioms. Walrasianism is based on the concepts of constrained optimization and equilibrium. Both premises are methodologically unacceptable.
So, what does the correct ‘little apparatus’ look like? Generally speaking, it is based upon a set of axioms that do not contain any Walrasian or Keynesian propositions. The replacement of obsolete premises amounts to a Paradigm Shift.
As a matter of principle, the analysis must always start with the most elementary case. This is the pure consumption economy. The theory of interest has to be developed out of the objectively given properties of the most elementary economic configuration. That is, to begin with, there are two firms; one produces the consumption good and the other money/credit. This firm is called the Central Bank, and it stands for the banking industry as a whole. For a start, only the household sector takes up credit. There is no investment in the pure consumption economy, and by consequence, no investment financing.
Under the objective condition of zero profit in both firms, we have Pc=Wc/Rc, the price of the consumption good is equal to unit wage costs, and ra=Wb/Rb, ditto for the rate of interest on the asset side of the Central Bank's balance sheet. If wage rates are set equal for simplicity, then we have ra/Pc=Rc/Rb, that is, the real interest rate is objectively determined by the production conditions in both industries. This is the point of departure of the objective Theory of Interest.
In the investment economy, things are a bit more complex. Normally, the household sector is the lender and the business sector is the borrower. Accordingly, one has two rates of interest ra and rl. The interest rate on the asset side of the Central Bank's balance sheet ra denotes what the business has to pay; the interest rate on the liability side rl denotes what the household sector is paid. Under the zero-profit condition, there is a fixed relationship between the two rates. The Central Bank, though, is in principle free to set any configuration of ra and rl. A very interesting limiting case is rl=0.
The Employment Law for the investment economy is shown on Graphic AXEC62a
From this equation follows inter alia:
(i) An increase in the expenditure ratio ρE leads to higher employment.
(ii) Increasing investment expenditures I exert a positive influence on employment.
(iii) An increase in the factor cost ratio ρF=W/PR leads to higher employment. This implies that an increase in the average wage rate W relative to price P and productivity R leads to higher employment (2015).
What remains to be done is to establish how the expenditure ratio depends on the deposit rate ρE=f(rl) and how investment depends on the lending rate I=f(ra). These two functions inserted into the Employment Law give the general relationship between employment, prices, and the two interest rates.
Conclusion: If the functional relations f(rl) and f(ra) are reliable and if the price mechanism works such that ρE is roughly constant, then the Central Bank is in the position to establish full employment by fine-tuning the two interest rates. By implication, if there is no reliable relationship, there is no lever for interest rate policy.
Wicksell’s natural-rate mechanism implies the equalization of saving and investment (Blaug, 1998, p. 621). It has already been shown in previous posts that this equality/ equilibrium NEVER occurs, neither ex-ante nor ex-post. And this, in turn, means that the concept of the natural rate has been fallacious from the start.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Blaug, M. (1998). Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition.
Deane, P. (1983). The Scope and Method of Economic Science. Economic Journal, 93(369): 1–12. URL
Hicks, J. R. (1939). Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edition.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Confused Confusers: How to Stop Thinking Like an Economist and Start Thinking Like a Scientist. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2207598: 1–16. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1946). The Decade of the Twenties. American Economic Review, 36(2): 1–10. URL
Related 'Macroeconomics: Drain the scientific swamp' and 'From false microfoundations to true macrofoundations (II)' and 'The canonical macroeconomic model' and 'Are economists methodological retards? and 'Down and out' and 'Humpty Dumpty is back again' and 'Accounting basics' and 'I=S: Mark of the Incompetent' and 'Interest and profit' and 'End of confusion' and 'Keynes and the logical brilliance of Bedlam'. For more details of the big picture, see cross-references Keynesianism.
Related 'The irreparable unreality of all ‘real’ models'
November 6, 2015
The x-th reinvention of evolutionary economics
Comment on ‘We Had It All Wrong. Adam Smith Isn’t the True Father of Economics’
Blog-Reference
You say that current Walrasianism is the wrong approach. That is true, of course. You take ‘Society is an Organism’ as a ‘hook for getting people to think in the right way’. This, unfortunately, is also a failed approach since Veblen founded the subdiscipline of evolutionary economics (strictly speaking, Malthus founded it and Darwin borrowed it). Here are the reasons why.
Economics has to develop its own methodology and neither copy it from Newton nor from Darwin. Imitation is exactly, as Feynman pointed out, what makes a cargo cult science (see Wikipedia). Evonomics does not pass the scientific fitness test but has some survival chances as a sitcom.
Blog-Reference
You say that current Walrasianism is the wrong approach. That is true, of course. You take ‘Society is an Organism’ as a ‘hook for getting people to think in the right way’. This, unfortunately, is also a failed approach since Veblen founded the subdiscipline of evolutionary economics (strictly speaking, Malthus founded it and Darwin borrowed it). Here are the reasons why.
- Are economists methodological retards?
- The Science-of-Man fallacy
- From PsySoc to SysHum
- Getting out of proto-scientific garbage
- PsySoc — the scourge of economics
- Redefining economics
Economics has to develop its own methodology and neither copy it from Newton nor from Darwin. Imitation is exactly, as Feynman pointed out, what makes a cargo cult science (see Wikipedia). Evonomics does not pass the scientific fitness test but has some survival chances as a sitcom.
November 5, 2015
Are economists methodological retards?
Comment on Henry of Nov 4 on Nov 5 on ‘Keynes on the Theory of Interest’
Blog-Reference
“Thousands upon thousands of scholars, as well as thousands of statesmen and men of affairs, have contributed their efforts to the attempt to understand the course of events of the economic world. And today this field of investigation is being cultivated more extensively, than ever before. How is it, then, that in all these years, and with all the undoubted talent that has been lavished upon it, the subject of economics has advanced so little?” (Schoeffler, 1955, p. 2)
On closer inspection, economics has not advanced at all compared to the contemporaneous evolution of physics, for example. What obscures the de facto regression is that economists have always taken the edge-of-science tools that have been developed elsewhere. Thus, over more than two centuries now, economics gave the impression of scientific progress while it has not moved one millimeter above the proto-scientific level of Adam Smith: “... we know little more now about ‘how the economy works,’ or about the modus operandi of the invisible hand than we knew in 1790 after Adam Smith completed the last revision of The Wealth of Nations. (Clower, 1999, p. 401)
When economists are occasionally sober after feasting in best-of-all possible worlds and queen-of-social-sciences storytelling, they seek an explanation for their dismal performance, and they readily rate themselves down to a science with a lowercase s.
“Economics is a strange sort of discipline. The booby traps I mentioned often make it sound as it is all just a matter of opinion. That is not so. Economics is not a Science with a capital S. It lacks the experimental method as a way of testing hypotheses. . . . There are always differences of opinion at the cutting edge of a science, . . . . But they last longer in economics . . . and there are reasons for that. As already mentioned, rival theories cannot be put to an experimental test. All there is to observe is history, and history does not conduct experiments: too many things are always happening at once. The inferences that can be made from history are always uncertain, always disputable, . . . You can’t even count on a long and undisturbed run of history, because the ‘laws’ of behavior change and evolve. Excuses, excuses. But the point is not to provide excuses.” (Solow, 1998, pp. x-xi)
Given a recalcitrant reality, clearly, the idea that there must be something wrong with economists seems rather far-fetched. Just the contrary: “Given these difficulties, it is extraordinary that economics has achieved as much as it has.” (Dow, 2006, p. 51)
So we could perhaps agree upon this: economics is not a failed science, only a lowercase-s science, and this is ultimately the fault of the subject matter.
The actual fact of the matter is, though, that economists have NEVER managed to come clear with the fundamental concepts of their subject matter. Economics is like medieval physics before the concept of energy was fully understood.
This is the state of affairs:
• Walrasianism/Neoclassics. Krugman gave the following definition: “So, what is neoclassical economics? … I think we mean in practice economics based on maximization-with-equilibrium.”*
And in this two-liner lies the whole explanation of why Neoclassics is a failed approach: because it is based on two NONENTITIES. For good methodological reasons, economics cannot take a behavioral assumption (constrained optimization or otherwise) and equilibrium into the premises. Economics is, to begin with, not a science of the behavior of humans but of the behavior of the economics system. As a matter of principle, no way leads from the understanding of human behavior to the understanding of how the economic system works.
• Keynesianism. Keynes famously defined the fundamental macroeconomic relations such: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)
This two-liner is provably false because Keynes never came to grips with profit. The equality/equalization of saving and investment is, in the Keynesian and in any other context, the absolutely reliable indicator of a fatal conceptual and logical defect.
• Heterodoxy has never come up with a serious alternative to both Walrasianism and Keynesianism and is rather content with knowing nothing and the pluralism of provably false theories. As Syll put it “Heterodoxy is different, you know, we do not lull us into the comforting thought that we know everything and that everything is measurable and we have everything under control. We just admit that we often simply do not know, and that we have to live with that uncertainty as well as it goes.”
The ultimate fault of Walrasianism and Keynesianism does not lie in any policy proposals but deep in the premises. As Keynes correctly realized with regard to Orthodoxy, “For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.” (1973, p. xxi)
The original logical defect of the representative economist consists of not having a consistent definition of the pivotal concepts of income and profit. The profit theory is false since Adam Smith and every economist can know this from the Palgrave Dictionary: “A satisfactory theory of profits is still elusive.” (Desai, 2008, p. 10)
Let this sink in. Neither Classicals, nor Walrasians, nor Marshallians, nor Marxians, nor Keynesians, nor Institutionalists, nor Monetary Economists, nor MMTers, nor Austrians, nor Sraffaians, nor Evolutionists, nor Game theorists, nor EconoPhysicists, nor RBCers, nor New Keynesians, nor New Classicals ever came to grips with profit. Hence, they all fail to capture the essence of the market economy.
That is the current abysmal state of economics. And, let it be clear: this is NOT the fault of the subject matter.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Clower, R. W. (1999). Post-Keynes Monetary and Financial Theory. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 21(3): 399–414. URL
Desai, M. (2008). Profit and Profit Theory. In S. N. Durlauf, and L. E. Blume (Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, pages 1–11. Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition. URL
Dow, S. C. (2006). Economic Methodology: An Inquiry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Schoeffler, S. (1955). The Failures of Economics: A Diagnostic Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Solow, R. M. (1998). Foreword, volume William Breit and Roger L. Ranson: The Academic Scribblers. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3rd edition.
* Unreferenced quotes have already been used and referenced on this blog.
Related 'Down and out'.
Blog-Reference
“Thousands upon thousands of scholars, as well as thousands of statesmen and men of affairs, have contributed their efforts to the attempt to understand the course of events of the economic world. And today this field of investigation is being cultivated more extensively, than ever before. How is it, then, that in all these years, and with all the undoubted talent that has been lavished upon it, the subject of economics has advanced so little?” (Schoeffler, 1955, p. 2)
On closer inspection, economics has not advanced at all compared to the contemporaneous evolution of physics, for example. What obscures the de facto regression is that economists have always taken the edge-of-science tools that have been developed elsewhere. Thus, over more than two centuries now, economics gave the impression of scientific progress while it has not moved one millimeter above the proto-scientific level of Adam Smith: “... we know little more now about ‘how the economy works,’ or about the modus operandi of the invisible hand than we knew in 1790 after Adam Smith completed the last revision of The Wealth of Nations. (Clower, 1999, p. 401)
When economists are occasionally sober after feasting in best-of-all possible worlds and queen-of-social-sciences storytelling, they seek an explanation for their dismal performance, and they readily rate themselves down to a science with a lowercase s.
“Economics is a strange sort of discipline. The booby traps I mentioned often make it sound as it is all just a matter of opinion. That is not so. Economics is not a Science with a capital S. It lacks the experimental method as a way of testing hypotheses. . . . There are always differences of opinion at the cutting edge of a science, . . . . But they last longer in economics . . . and there are reasons for that. As already mentioned, rival theories cannot be put to an experimental test. All there is to observe is history, and history does not conduct experiments: too many things are always happening at once. The inferences that can be made from history are always uncertain, always disputable, . . . You can’t even count on a long and undisturbed run of history, because the ‘laws’ of behavior change and evolve. Excuses, excuses. But the point is not to provide excuses.” (Solow, 1998, pp. x-xi)
Given a recalcitrant reality, clearly, the idea that there must be something wrong with economists seems rather far-fetched. Just the contrary: “Given these difficulties, it is extraordinary that economics has achieved as much as it has.” (Dow, 2006, p. 51)
So we could perhaps agree upon this: economics is not a failed science, only a lowercase-s science, and this is ultimately the fault of the subject matter.
The actual fact of the matter is, though, that economists have NEVER managed to come clear with the fundamental concepts of their subject matter. Economics is like medieval physics before the concept of energy was fully understood.
This is the state of affairs:
• Walrasianism/Neoclassics. Krugman gave the following definition: “So, what is neoclassical economics? … I think we mean in practice economics based on maximization-with-equilibrium.”*
And in this two-liner lies the whole explanation of why Neoclassics is a failed approach: because it is based on two NONENTITIES. For good methodological reasons, economics cannot take a behavioral assumption (constrained optimization or otherwise) and equilibrium into the premises. Economics is, to begin with, not a science of the behavior of humans but of the behavior of the economics system. As a matter of principle, no way leads from the understanding of human behavior to the understanding of how the economic system works.
• Keynesianism. Keynes famously defined the fundamental macroeconomic relations such: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)
This two-liner is provably false because Keynes never came to grips with profit. The equality/equalization of saving and investment is, in the Keynesian and in any other context, the absolutely reliable indicator of a fatal conceptual and logical defect.
• Heterodoxy has never come up with a serious alternative to both Walrasianism and Keynesianism and is rather content with knowing nothing and the pluralism of provably false theories. As Syll put it “Heterodoxy is different, you know, we do not lull us into the comforting thought that we know everything and that everything is measurable and we have everything under control. We just admit that we often simply do not know, and that we have to live with that uncertainty as well as it goes.”
The ultimate fault of Walrasianism and Keynesianism does not lie in any policy proposals but deep in the premises. As Keynes correctly realized with regard to Orthodoxy, “For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.” (1973, p. xxi)
The original logical defect of the representative economist consists of not having a consistent definition of the pivotal concepts of income and profit. The profit theory is false since Adam Smith and every economist can know this from the Palgrave Dictionary: “A satisfactory theory of profits is still elusive.” (Desai, 2008, p. 10)
Let this sink in. Neither Classicals, nor Walrasians, nor Marshallians, nor Marxians, nor Keynesians, nor Institutionalists, nor Monetary Economists, nor MMTers, nor Austrians, nor Sraffaians, nor Evolutionists, nor Game theorists, nor EconoPhysicists, nor RBCers, nor New Keynesians, nor New Classicals ever came to grips with profit. Hence, they all fail to capture the essence of the market economy.
That is the current abysmal state of economics. And, let it be clear: this is NOT the fault of the subject matter.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Clower, R. W. (1999). Post-Keynes Monetary and Financial Theory. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 21(3): 399–414. URL
Desai, M. (2008). Profit and Profit Theory. In S. N. Durlauf, and L. E. Blume (Eds.), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Online, pages 1–11. Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd edition. URL
Dow, S. C. (2006). Economic Methodology: An Inquiry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Schoeffler, S. (1955). The Failures of Economics: A Diagnostic Study. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Solow, R. M. (1998). Foreword, volume William Breit and Roger L. Ranson: The Academic Scribblers. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3rd edition.
* Unreferenced quotes have already been used and referenced on this blog.
Related 'Down and out'.
***
Graphic AXEC109iA new more Keynesian employment theory
Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Larry Summers — ‘New Keynesian’ economics needs to be replaced’
Blog-Reference
Krugman comes directly to the core of the matter: “So, what is neoclassical economics? … I think we mean in practice economics based on maximization-with-equilibrium.” (See intro)
And that is exactly why Neoclassicism is a failed approach: because it is based on two nonentities. For good methodological reasons, economics cannot take a behavioral assumption (constrained optimization or otherwise) and equilibrium into the premises. Economics is, to begin with, not a science of the behavior of humans but of the behavior of the economics system.#1 As a matter of principle, no way leads from the understanding of human behavior to the understanding of how the economic system works. Neoclassical economics is a casualty of the Science-of-Man Fallacy. #2
So, the whole of economics has to be based on an entirely new set of foundational propositions. This operation is commonly known as a paradigm shift. Keynes understood this very well: “The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world ... Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except ... to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required to-day in economics.” (1973, p. 16)
Non-Euclidean means in this context: Krugman’s two nonentities have to be left out of the formal foundations. This, by the way, makes all of Lars Syll’s microfoundations critique of DSGE redundant.
When we start from purely objective structural premises, then the most elementary version of the correct Employment Law reads as follows (Graphic AXEC62)
Blog-Reference
Krugman comes directly to the core of the matter: “So, what is neoclassical economics? … I think we mean in practice economics based on maximization-with-equilibrium.” (See intro)
And that is exactly why Neoclassicism is a failed approach: because it is based on two nonentities. For good methodological reasons, economics cannot take a behavioral assumption (constrained optimization or otherwise) and equilibrium into the premises. Economics is, to begin with, not a science of the behavior of humans but of the behavior of the economics system.#1 As a matter of principle, no way leads from the understanding of human behavior to the understanding of how the economic system works. Neoclassical economics is a casualty of the Science-of-Man Fallacy. #2
So, the whole of economics has to be based on an entirely new set of foundational propositions. This operation is commonly known as a paradigm shift. Keynes understood this very well: “The classical theorists resemble Euclidean geometers in a non-Euclidean world ... Yet, in truth, there is no remedy except ... to work out a non-Euclidean geometry. Something similar is required to-day in economics.” (1973, p. 16)
Non-Euclidean means in this context: Krugman’s two nonentities have to be left out of the formal foundations. This, by the way, makes all of Lars Syll’s microfoundations critique of DSGE redundant.
When we start from purely objective structural premises, then the most elementary version of the correct Employment Law reads as follows (Graphic AXEC62)
From this equation follows inter alia:
(i) An increase in the expenditure ratio ρE leads to higher employment. An expenditure ratio ρE>1 indicates credit expansion, a ratio ρE<1 indicates credit contraction/debt repayment of private households.
(ii) Increasing investment expenditures I exert a positive influence on employment; a slowdown of growth does the opposite.
(iii) An increase in the factor cost ratio ρF≡W/PR leads to higher employment. This implies that a higher average wage rate W leads to higher employment. This is, of course, contrary to conventional economic wisdom. It is, though, easy to prove that conventional wisdom is a mere Fallacy of Composition (2015).
(iv) The complete Employment Law is a bit longer and contains, in addition, profit distribution, public deficit spending, and the trade balance with the rest of the world.
Points (i) and (ii) constitute a Keynesian multiplier. Let us focus here alone on the factor cost ratio ρF as defined in (iii). This variable embodies the price mechanism, which, however, does not work as the representative economist hallucinates. As a matter of fact, overall employment increases if the average wage rate W increases relative to the average price P and productivity R. The factor cost ratio is what is missing in Keynes’s original employment function (2012).
The correct employment theory states that the average wage rate must rise in order to prevent unemployment and deflation. To this day, the representative economist has not realized that the overall systemic interdependencies establish a positive feedback loop between ‘the’ product and ‘the’ labor market, that is, wage rate down - employment down - wage rate down - and so on. Vice versa with an increasing average wage rate. This is exactly what Keynes said in ‘The Great Slump of 1930.’
The market system is not an equilibrium system (2015). And because of this, all equilibrium models are a priori false. This includes all variants of DSGE. Employment is determined according to the extended Employment Law in the most elementary case by the expenditure ratio, investment, and the factor cost ratio, which in turn depends on the (average) wage rate, price, and productivity. Interest is brought into the picture as soon as the relationships between investment and the lending rate, the expenditure ratio, and the deposit rate (if ρE<1) are formally established.
The extended Employment Law sorta-kinda fully replaces the New Keynesian sorta-kinda maximization-with-equilibrium garbage.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). Keynes’s Employment Function and the Gratuitous Phillips Curve Disaster. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2130421: 1–19. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
#1 From PsySoc to SysHum
#2 The Science-of-Man Fallacy
Related 'The key relationship between employment and wage rate' and 'The key relationship between employment and growing/shrinking debt'. For details of the big picture, see the cross-references Employment
All heterodox economists agree 'New Keynesian economics needs to be replaced'. Therefore, the one and only interesting question is wherewith?
Take the formula Graphic AXEC06
(i) An increase in the expenditure ratio ρE leads to higher employment. An expenditure ratio ρE>1 indicates credit expansion, a ratio ρE<1 indicates credit contraction/debt repayment of private households.
(ii) Increasing investment expenditures I exert a positive influence on employment; a slowdown of growth does the opposite.
(iii) An increase in the factor cost ratio ρF≡W/PR leads to higher employment. This implies that a higher average wage rate W leads to higher employment. This is, of course, contrary to conventional economic wisdom. It is, though, easy to prove that conventional wisdom is a mere Fallacy of Composition (2015).
(iv) The complete Employment Law is a bit longer and contains, in addition, profit distribution, public deficit spending, and the trade balance with the rest of the world.
Points (i) and (ii) constitute a Keynesian multiplier. Let us focus here alone on the factor cost ratio ρF as defined in (iii). This variable embodies the price mechanism, which, however, does not work as the representative economist hallucinates. As a matter of fact, overall employment increases if the average wage rate W increases relative to the average price P and productivity R. The factor cost ratio is what is missing in Keynes’s original employment function (2012).
The correct employment theory states that the average wage rate must rise in order to prevent unemployment and deflation. To this day, the representative economist has not realized that the overall systemic interdependencies establish a positive feedback loop between ‘the’ product and ‘the’ labor market, that is, wage rate down - employment down - wage rate down - and so on. Vice versa with an increasing average wage rate. This is exactly what Keynes said in ‘The Great Slump of 1930.’
The market system is not an equilibrium system (2015). And because of this, all equilibrium models are a priori false. This includes all variants of DSGE. Employment is determined according to the extended Employment Law in the most elementary case by the expenditure ratio, investment, and the factor cost ratio, which in turn depends on the (average) wage rate, price, and productivity. Interest is brought into the picture as soon as the relationships between investment and the lending rate, the expenditure ratio, and the deposit rate (if ρE<1) are formally established.
The extended Employment Law sorta-kinda fully replaces the New Keynesian sorta-kinda maximization-with-equilibrium garbage.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). Keynes’s Employment Function and the Gratuitous Phillips Curve Disaster. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2130421: 1–19. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
#1 From PsySoc to SysHum
#2 The Science-of-Man Fallacy
Related 'The key relationship between employment and wage rate' and 'The key relationship between employment and growing/shrinking debt'. For details of the big picture, see the cross-references Employment
***
ICYMI comment on batux99All heterodox economists agree 'New Keynesian economics needs to be replaced'. Therefore, the one and only interesting question is wherewith?
Take the formula Graphic AXEC06
This is the First Economic Law that contains the interrelation between the consolidated business sector’s cost/profit situation ρF, the real ρX and the nominal ρE side of the product market, and the income distribution ρD. For more details, see The Profit Theory is False Since Adam Smith. What About the True Distribution Theory?
Again: replacement is the issue and not one more superfluous discussion about New Keynesian moronomics.
Again: replacement is the issue and not one more superfluous discussion about New Keynesian moronomics.
November 4, 2015
Hayek: mad, bad, or just another incompetent economist?
Comment on David S. Wilson on ‘The Road to Ideology. How Friedrich Hayek Became a Monster’
Blog-Reference
You say “Science is necessary to solve the problems of modern existence but it is not sufficient on its own. There must also be compelling narratives capable of reaching and animating large audiences.” (See intro)
This is a huge misunderstanding. Science is about knowledge and not about animating large audiences. Genuine scientists are as happy as can be when the large audience goes to the Circus Maximus and makes a thumb up when the gladiator kills the lion or vice versa. Remember what Plato wrote above the entrance of the first academy about non-scientists?: "Let None But Geometers Enter Here."
Your second misunderstanding is that Hayek was an economist and that economics is a science. This is downright ridiculous.
First of all, it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between political and theoretical economics. The main differences are
(i) The goal of political economics is to push an agenda, the goal of theoretical economics is to explain how the actual economy works.
(ii) In political economics anything goes; in theoretical economics, scientific standards are observed.
Theoretical economics has to be judged according to the criteria true/false and nothing else. The history of political economics since Adam Smith can be summarized as a perpetual violation of well-defined scientific standards.
The fact of the matter is that theoretical economics has been hijacked by the agenda pushers of political economics. Smith and Ricardo fought against the precapitalistic order, Marx and Keynes were agenda pushers, so were Hayek and Friedman, and so are Krugman and Varoufakis.
Hayek, of course, had the right to write political pamphlets, defend capitalism, support Thatcher, and found a political club like Mont Pelerin. One thing, though, should be perfectly clear: the moment an economist starts with politics he leaves economics, understood as a science, for good. It is the mixture that is toxic.
Ask yourself: when Krugman supports the Democrats, Wren-Lewis and Keen support Corbyn, and Varoufakis fights for democratizing the Eurozone, has this anything to do with scientific research? What have they and Hayek in common? Neither has a scientifically valid theory about how the economy works. Hayekian economics never satisfied the criteria of material and formal consistency. His economics was not good enough for science but good enough for politics.
Political economics is for animating large audiences, theoretical economics is not and never will be. Politics has to be separated from science and thrown out of economics — the sooner, the better. Let’s start with Hayek!
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
Related 'Free academia from economics' and 'The Science-of-Man fallacy and 'How to be a good scientist' and 'The case for pure economics' and 'Separation of politics and economics'
Blog-Reference
You say “Science is necessary to solve the problems of modern existence but it is not sufficient on its own. There must also be compelling narratives capable of reaching and animating large audiences.” (See intro)
This is a huge misunderstanding. Science is about knowledge and not about animating large audiences. Genuine scientists are as happy as can be when the large audience goes to the Circus Maximus and makes a thumb up when the gladiator kills the lion or vice versa. Remember what Plato wrote above the entrance of the first academy about non-scientists?: "Let None But Geometers Enter Here."
Your second misunderstanding is that Hayek was an economist and that economics is a science. This is downright ridiculous.
First of all, it is of the utmost importance to distinguish between political and theoretical economics. The main differences are
(i) The goal of political economics is to push an agenda, the goal of theoretical economics is to explain how the actual economy works.
(ii) In political economics anything goes; in theoretical economics, scientific standards are observed.
Theoretical economics has to be judged according to the criteria true/false and nothing else. The history of political economics since Adam Smith can be summarized as a perpetual violation of well-defined scientific standards.
The fact of the matter is that theoretical economics has been hijacked by the agenda pushers of political economics. Smith and Ricardo fought against the precapitalistic order, Marx and Keynes were agenda pushers, so were Hayek and Friedman, and so are Krugman and Varoufakis.
Hayek, of course, had the right to write political pamphlets, defend capitalism, support Thatcher, and found a political club like Mont Pelerin. One thing, though, should be perfectly clear: the moment an economist starts with politics he leaves economics, understood as a science, for good. It is the mixture that is toxic.
Ask yourself: when Krugman supports the Democrats, Wren-Lewis and Keen support Corbyn, and Varoufakis fights for democratizing the Eurozone, has this anything to do with scientific research? What have they and Hayek in common? Neither has a scientifically valid theory about how the economy works. Hayekian economics never satisfied the criteria of material and formal consistency. His economics was not good enough for science but good enough for politics.
Political economics is for animating large audiences, theoretical economics is not and never will be. Politics has to be separated from science and thrown out of economics — the sooner, the better. Let’s start with Hayek!
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
Related 'Free academia from economics' and 'The Science-of-Man fallacy and 'How to be a good scientist' and 'The case for pure economics' and 'Separation of politics and economics'
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