Comment on Paul Spicker on ‘On economics as a science’
Blog-Reference
Since Adam Smith and Karl Marx, economics claims to be a science. And this claim is officially enshrined in the title: “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel”.
Now Paul Spicker tells us that economics is not a science as everybody thought until now but practical wisdom, an exercise in what Aristotle called phronesis: “It is all about judgment ― reading the situation, identifying patterns, applying conflicting principles, anticipating problems, spying opportunities. There are no certainties; there are tendencies, warnings, prescriptions and the recognition of trends or patterns, all subject to many reservations.”#1 This sounds sensible but, obviously, phronesis is very different from what Aristotle called episteme=knowledge=science.
The fact of the matter is that economics is a failed science and after more than 200 years there is proof enough that both orthodox AND heterodox economists are incompetent scientists (2013). Science is well-defined by formal and material consistency: “Research is, in fact, a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31). Clearly, economics does NOT satisfy the criteria of formal and material consistency. Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, Austrianism are mutually contradictory and each one is provably false. Strictly speaking, there is no economics only a heap of scientific garbage. The question is how to proceed from this incontrovertible fact? Phronesis has always been an attractive option and an easy way out of the calamity for the representative economist, but let us look at the bigger picture.
(i) First of all, the word sciences has to be eliminated from the title “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel”. The general public has to be promptly informed of the actual state of economics. Actually, economics is a failed science.
(ii) All attempts to redefine science and to soften the criteria so that a proto-science like economics fits in have to stop immediately. Science is well-defined and one is either in or out. There is nothing to negotiate, neither for economics in particular nor for the so-called social sciences in general.
(iii) There is no point in explaining again and again why economics is not and cannot be a science. Here is, once and for all, the exhaustive tick-box list of excuses: “Economics is a strange sort of discipline. The booby traps I mentioned often make it sound as it is all just a matter of opinion. That is not so. Economics is not a Science with a capital S. It lacks the experimental method as a way of testing hypotheses. . . . There are always differences of opinion at the cutting edge of a science, . . . . But they last longer in economics . . . and there are reasons for that. As already mentioned, rival theories cannot be put to an experimental test. All there is to observe is history, and history does not conduct experiments: too many things are always happening at once. The inferences that can be made from history are always uncertain, always disputable, . . . You can’t even count on a long and undisturbed run of history, because the ‘laws’ of behavior change and evolve. Excuses, excuses. But the point is not to provide excuses.” (Solow, 1998, pp. x-xi). Note well, that NONE of these arguments holds water, except for “Economics is not a Science with a capital S” which translates into the correct short variant “Economics is not a Science” which in turn contradicts all claims from Adam Smith onward.
(iv) With regard to the future, economists have to make up their minds whether they intend to comply with the immutable standards of science. If so they have to put forward an idea of how to perform the necessary Paradigm Shift. Otherwise, voluntary/involuntary retirement from academia/science is inevitable. What has been produced so far is scientifically forever unacceptable.
(v) All those who know at their hearts that they will never rise above the level of agenda-pushing and storytelling have only the option to follow the lead of Paul Spicker and to busy themselves with space/time specific practical problems without any understanding of the big picture. Their proper business is phronesis or what nowadays is called consultancy. Peirce nicely defined the difference between the scientist and the consultant: “True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men.” (1931, 1.76)
The spirit of science is very different from the utilitarianism of the commonsensical and practical man. In a nutshell, the following anecdote highlights the clash of cultures: “At one point in that 100 years, Lord Ernest Rutherford was visited by a minister of the Queen. He proudly and busily demonstrated what he had learned about radio. The minister said, that’s all very good, but what is it good for. Lord Rutherford replied that he did not know, but he guaranteed that at some point the government would tax it.”#2
Accordingly, the task of the economist as a scientist is to figure out how the monetary economy works. Not more, not less. It is not his task to figure out how people behave (Hudík, 2011). This, indeed, is the subject matter of psychology, sociology, political science, and other so-called social sciences. Economics is NOT a social science but a systems science. A system is subject to objective systemic laws while human nature/behavior/action is contingent. Strictly speaking, for deeper methodological reasons there is no such thing as ― what Hume called ― a Science of Man.
Economics started as Political Economy and what economists never understood is that NO way leads from the understanding of human nature/behavior/action to the understanding of how the economic system works. The feeble thinkers and strong blatherers that call themselves economists have to this day not figured out how the monetary economy works, more specifically, how the price and profit mechanism works. This is not to say, of course, that economists know nothing. In fact, they know some easy to grasp practical, institutional, or historical details. This, though, is phronesis, as Aristotle made clear, but NOT episteme/science.
Political Economy is agenda pushing and economists from Smith, Ricardo, Marx, Keynes, Hayek, Friedman to the present were agenda pushers first and scientists second. As a matter of fact, they were lousy scientists because they never figured out how the monetary economy works. How do we know this? We know this for sure because the Profit Theory is provably false and without the correct profit theory, the economist cannot rise above the level of storytelling.
Economics is a failed science. The very task of Heterodoxy is to make economics a science. To this day, Heterodoxy did not succeed. What is needed is a Paradigm Shift, that is, a full replacement of the ridiculous behavioral axioms of standard economics. Phronesis, as proposed by Paul Spicker, is not a Paradigm Shift but scientific suicide and self-burial.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Hudík, M. (2011). Why Economics is Not a Science of Behaviour. Journal of Economic Methodology, 18(2): 147–162.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Confused Confusers: How to Stop Thinking Like an Economist and Start Thinking Like a Scientist. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2207598: 1–16. URL
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Peirce, C. S. (1931). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume I. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. URL
Solow, R. M. (1998). Foreword, volume William Breit and Roger L. Ranson: The Academic Scribblers. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 3rd edition.
#1 See his RWER paper.
#2 Source PSW.
This blog connects to the AXEC Project which applies a superior method of economic analysis. The following comments have been posted on selected blogs as catalysts for the ongoing Paradigm Shift. The comments are brought together here for information. The full debates are directly accessible via the Blog-References. Scrap the lot and start again―that is what a Paradigm Shift is all about. Time to make economics a science.
August 4, 2016
August 3, 2016
Voluntary full employment and involuntary full stupidity
Comment on Lars Syll on ‘AD/AS models and the ‘disappearance’ of involuntary unemployment’
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Aug 7
Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, and Austrian economists are groping in the dark with regard to the two most important features of the market economy: the price mechanism and the profit mechanism. The fault lies in the fact that economists argue from false premises, that is, Walrasianism in all shapes and forms (DSGE, RBC, AD/AS, etc.) argues from unacceptable microfoundations, and Keynesianism in all shapes and forms argues from false macrofoundations (2011).
To get out of failed economics requires nothing less than a paradigm shift from the accustomed amateurish nonsense to entirely new axiomatic foundations.
In the following, a sketch* of the formally and empirically correct employment theory is given. A rather elementary version of the objective structural macroeconomic Employment Law (2012) is shown on Graphic AXEC62
From this equation follows:
(i) An increase in the expenditure ratio ρE leads to higher employment (the Greek letter ρ stands for ratio). An expenditure ratio ρE greater than 1 indicates credit expansion, a ratio ρE less than 1 indicates credit contraction. The expenditure ratio fully replaces the concept of a consumption function.
(ii) Increasing investment expenditures I exert a positive influence on employment; a slowdown of growth does the opposite.
(iii) An increase in the factor cost ratio ρF≡W/PR leads to higher employment.
The complete AND testable Employment Law is a bit longer and contains in addition profit distribution, public deficit spending, and import/export. It contains NO behavioral assumptions of any sort.
Items (i) and (ii) cover Keynes’ arguments about aggregate demand, which have been commonsensically right but formally defective. More precisely, Keynes’s multiplier is provably false (see 2012). The factor cost ratio ρF as defined in (iii) embodies the price mechanism which works very differently from what the representative economist falsely assumes. As a matter of fact, overall employment INCREASES if the average wage rate W INCREASES relative to the average price P and productivity R.
For the relationship between real wage, productivity, profit, and real shares, see (2015, Sec. 10).
So, in simple terms, full employment (in any definition) can be achieved by increasing overall demand (expenditure ratio, investment expenditures, etc.) or by INCREASING the average wage rate or by a combination of the two.
Keynes’ approach is macrofounded but incomplete because he had no deeper understanding of the price and profit mechanism. Both the Walrasian and Keynesian approaches have produced misleading policy advice. To propose a reduction of the average wage rate in a recession/depression, as orthodox economists did repeatedly, is a manifestation/proof of utter scientific incompetence. The AD/AS model is one of the most ridiculous attempts to formalize fundamental economic relationships. For the correct approach, see (2015).
The structural Employment Law contains nothing but measurable variables and is therefore readily testable. So, there is NO need for prolonged waffling about Walrasian or Keynesian models or voluntary/involuntary unemployment. As always in science, a test decides the matter. What is beyond any doubt is that both orthodox and heterodox economics have been OUTSIDE of science since its inception.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). Keynes’s Employment Function and the Gratuitous Phillips Curve Disaster. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2130421: 1–19. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
* Students are referred to the working papers for more details.
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Aug 7
Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, and Austrian economists are groping in the dark with regard to the two most important features of the market economy: the price mechanism and the profit mechanism. The fault lies in the fact that economists argue from false premises, that is, Walrasianism in all shapes and forms (DSGE, RBC, AD/AS, etc.) argues from unacceptable microfoundations, and Keynesianism in all shapes and forms argues from false macrofoundations (2011).
To get out of failed economics requires nothing less than a paradigm shift from the accustomed amateurish nonsense to entirely new axiomatic foundations.
In the following, a sketch* of the formally and empirically correct employment theory is given. A rather elementary version of the objective structural macroeconomic Employment Law (2012) is shown on Graphic AXEC62
From this equation follows:
(i) An increase in the expenditure ratio ρE leads to higher employment (the Greek letter ρ stands for ratio). An expenditure ratio ρE greater than 1 indicates credit expansion, a ratio ρE less than 1 indicates credit contraction. The expenditure ratio fully replaces the concept of a consumption function.
(ii) Increasing investment expenditures I exert a positive influence on employment; a slowdown of growth does the opposite.
(iii) An increase in the factor cost ratio ρF≡W/PR leads to higher employment.
The complete AND testable Employment Law is a bit longer and contains in addition profit distribution, public deficit spending, and import/export. It contains NO behavioral assumptions of any sort.
Items (i) and (ii) cover Keynes’ arguments about aggregate demand, which have been commonsensically right but formally defective. More precisely, Keynes’s multiplier is provably false (see 2012). The factor cost ratio ρF as defined in (iii) embodies the price mechanism which works very differently from what the representative economist falsely assumes. As a matter of fact, overall employment INCREASES if the average wage rate W INCREASES relative to the average price P and productivity R.
For the relationship between real wage, productivity, profit, and real shares, see (2015, Sec. 10).
So, in simple terms, full employment (in any definition) can be achieved by increasing overall demand (expenditure ratio, investment expenditures, etc.) or by INCREASING the average wage rate or by a combination of the two.
Keynes’ approach is macrofounded but incomplete because he had no deeper understanding of the price and profit mechanism. Both the Walrasian and Keynesian approaches have produced misleading policy advice. To propose a reduction of the average wage rate in a recession/depression, as orthodox economists did repeatedly, is a manifestation/proof of utter scientific incompetence. The AD/AS model is one of the most ridiculous attempts to formalize fundamental economic relationships. For the correct approach, see (2015).
The structural Employment Law contains nothing but measurable variables and is therefore readily testable. So, there is NO need for prolonged waffling about Walrasian or Keynesian models or voluntary/involuntary unemployment. As always in science, a test decides the matter. What is beyond any doubt is that both orthodox and heterodox economics have been OUTSIDE of science since its inception.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). Keynes’s Employment Function and the Gratuitous Phillips Curve Disaster. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2130421: 1–19. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
* Students are referred to the working papers for more details.
August 1, 2016
Post Keynesianism, science, and universal idiocy
Comment on Lars Syll on ‘What is Post Keynesian Economics?’
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Nov 10 and Blog-Reference on May 30, 2017
There are science and non-science. The former is the realm where the criterion true/false is applied and nothing else, the latter is the vast realm of what J. S. Mill called universal idiocy (1879, p. 26).
True/false in turn has two inseparable aspects: “Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31)
Logical consistency is methodologically secured by the axiomatic-deductive method. This method presupposes firm ground to start with or, as Aristotle put it: “When the premises are certain, true, and primary, and the conclusion formally follows from them, this is demonstration, and produces scientific knowledge of a thing.” Without a firm ground, logic runs amok and thus contributes to universal idiocy. As Keynes aptly remarked: “... a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam.” (Moggridge, 1976, p. 36). This, clearly, is NOT an argument against logic but against logic that lacks firm ground. Logical consistency is indispensable.
Refutation of a theory/model consists of proof that it is either logically inconsistent or empirically inconsistent. Theories/models that take nonentities into the premises (angels, unicorns, Santa Claus, utility, equilibrium, etcetera) are a priori OUTSIDE of science. However, sometimes it is not immediately obvious whether a word denotes a nonentity or not, e.g. ether or phlogiston or extraterrestrials. Nonentities are the conversation topic of universal idiocy, entities are the subject matter of science.
Keynes was very clear about the all-decisive importance of sound premises: “For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.” (1973, p. xxi)
Keynes left not the slightest doubt that Orthodoxy’s premises are false. Consequently, he left them behind and formulated the foundational syllogism of the General Theory as follows: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)
This elementary syllogism, though, is conceptually and logically defective because Keynes did not come to grips with profit and therefore “discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010, p. 12). As a result, the whole Post Keynesian theoretical superstructure is false (2011).
Because Keynes did not get the macrofoundations right the Keynesian Revolution ultimately failed. Just like his predecessors, Keynes had no idea of the fundamental concepts of economics, viz. profit and income. Yet, neither Keynesians nor Post Keynesians nor New Keynesians nor Anti-Keynesians ever spotted the logical inconsistency in Keynes’ macrofoundations. Not very profound thinkers these Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, Austrian folks.
As a result, model bricolage, discussion, and debate drifted away into the realm of economic nonentities like general equilibrium, ergodicity, rational expectations, or the vacuous pseudo-realism of uncertainty, animal spirits, or folk psychology/sociology/ politics.
The axiomatic foundations of economics are provably false for more than 150 years in the case of Walrasianism and for more than 80 years in the case of Post Keynesianism. Because of this, the economic policy advice of BOTH Walrasians AND Keynesians has NO sound scientific foundation (2015). Like Walrasianism, Post Keynesianism is NOT an instantiation of science but an instantiation of universal idiocy.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Mill, J. S. (1879). Utilitarianism. URL
Moggridge, D. E. (1976). Keynes. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL
Related 'Post Keynesianism, too, is proto-scientific garbage' and 'Keynesianism ― the economists’ senile dementia' and 'Economists: just too stupid for counting' and 'Keynes’ intellectual nonexistence' and Profit. For details of the big picture see cross-references Political Economics/Stupidity/Corruption and cross-references Keynesianism.
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Nov 10 and Blog-Reference on May 30, 2017
There are science and non-science. The former is the realm where the criterion true/false is applied and nothing else, the latter is the vast realm of what J. S. Mill called universal idiocy (1879, p. 26).
True/false in turn has two inseparable aspects: “Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31)
Logical consistency is methodologically secured by the axiomatic-deductive method. This method presupposes firm ground to start with or, as Aristotle put it: “When the premises are certain, true, and primary, and the conclusion formally follows from them, this is demonstration, and produces scientific knowledge of a thing.” Without a firm ground, logic runs amok and thus contributes to universal idiocy. As Keynes aptly remarked: “... a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam.” (Moggridge, 1976, p. 36). This, clearly, is NOT an argument against logic but against logic that lacks firm ground. Logical consistency is indispensable.
Refutation of a theory/model consists of proof that it is either logically inconsistent or empirically inconsistent. Theories/models that take nonentities into the premises (angels, unicorns, Santa Claus, utility, equilibrium, etcetera) are a priori OUTSIDE of science. However, sometimes it is not immediately obvious whether a word denotes a nonentity or not, e.g. ether or phlogiston or extraterrestrials. Nonentities are the conversation topic of universal idiocy, entities are the subject matter of science.
Keynes was very clear about the all-decisive importance of sound premises: “For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.” (1973, p. xxi)
Keynes left not the slightest doubt that Orthodoxy’s premises are false. Consequently, he left them behind and formulated the foundational syllogism of the General Theory as follows: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)
This elementary syllogism, though, is conceptually and logically defective because Keynes did not come to grips with profit and therefore “discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010, p. 12). As a result, the whole Post Keynesian theoretical superstructure is false (2011).
Because Keynes did not get the macrofoundations right the Keynesian Revolution ultimately failed. Just like his predecessors, Keynes had no idea of the fundamental concepts of economics, viz. profit and income. Yet, neither Keynesians nor Post Keynesians nor New Keynesians nor Anti-Keynesians ever spotted the logical inconsistency in Keynes’ macrofoundations. Not very profound thinkers these Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, Austrian folks.
As a result, model bricolage, discussion, and debate drifted away into the realm of economic nonentities like general equilibrium, ergodicity, rational expectations, or the vacuous pseudo-realism of uncertainty, animal spirits, or folk psychology/sociology/ politics.
The axiomatic foundations of economics are provably false for more than 150 years in the case of Walrasianism and for more than 80 years in the case of Post Keynesianism. Because of this, the economic policy advice of BOTH Walrasians AND Keynesians has NO sound scientific foundation (2015). Like Walrasianism, Post Keynesianism is NOT an instantiation of science but an instantiation of universal idiocy.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Mill, J. S. (1879). Utilitarianism. URL
Moggridge, D. E. (1976). Keynes. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL
Related 'Post Keynesianism, too, is proto-scientific garbage' and 'Keynesianism ― the economists’ senile dementia' and 'Economists: just too stupid for counting' and 'Keynes’ intellectual nonexistence' and Profit. For details of the big picture see cross-references Political Economics/Stupidity/Corruption and cross-references Keynesianism.
July 31, 2016
The unfinished Keynes (c)
Comment on Paul Davidson on ‘The Keynes Solution’
Blog-Reference
It is trivial but worth repeating: political economics and theoretical economics are different things and have to be strictly kept apart. The core problem of economics as a science is, of course, that by its very nature it is closely entangled with politics. The biggest threat to theoretical economics is that it gets hijacked by those with a political agenda. It does not matter whether this agenda is good or bad in predefined moral terms. Science is committed to its own criteria or it ceases to be science.
But are we not all inescapably involved in the struggle between good and bad/evil? Politics, religion, and philosophy say so. But even if this were true, it cannot serve as a justification to hijack science or to let it be hijacked. What has to be recognized is that science is about true/false and not good/bad or like/dislike. This distinction is part of the demarcation problem, which is the fundamental problem of methodology (Popper, 1980, p. 34).
Keynes had a political agenda, and this was his first priority. Let us agree for the moment that his attempt to alleviate unemployment was good and right without any qualification. Hence we all can accept Keynes' agenda ― except for one point: Keynes used theoretical economics for political purposes. This is unacceptable.
“A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from certain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him for the decision.” (Mill, 2006, p. 950)
Having taken politics out of the way, the next question is about the scientific content of the General Theory. Here we can ― in very general terms ― side with Allais: “... mais son [Keynes'] insuffisance logique ne lui a pas permis de résoudre les problèmes que son intuition lui avait fait entrevoir.” (1993, p. 70) In other words, Keynes saw the problems but could not solve them due to a lack of logical consequences.
With his comment on Hayek “... a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam. (Moggridge, 1976, p. 36) he won the everlasting sympathies of all who have their own troubles with logic.
In more specific terms we can definitively declare that the formal foundations of Keynesianism are logically defective since the General Theory. Keynes’ fundamental equations of macroeconomics, i.e. Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income – consumption. Therefore saving = investment, is indefensible. That is why Keynesianism is a failure (2011; 2014b).
The deeper reason is that Keynes ― just like his predecessors and fellows ― did not come to grips with profit.
“His Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the Profit Puzzle up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end he gave up and discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010, pp. 12-13, 16), see also (2014a; 2015)
It is no contradiction to acknowledge that Keynes was one of the good guys of political economics and not to accept the General Theory as a valid contribution to theoretical economics. Yet good intentions are not a scientific criterion, only material and formal consistency count. So what is left?
Keynes’ economic policy ideas were not exactly innovative. “Public works to relieve the unemployed is an idea as old as the Bible; ...” (Blaug, 1998, p. 662)
Keynes' lasting scientific contribution relates to methodology. He spoke it out loud so that every fellow economist could hear it: Throw over the classical axioms and put theoretical economics on new foundations. What else could Keynesian Revolution mean than a Paradigm Shift? Keynes pointed the way but could not follow it himself.#1
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Allais, M. (1993). Les Fondements Comptable de la Macro-Économie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd edition.
Blaug, M. (1998). Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014a). Mr. Keynes, Prof. Krugman, IS-LM, and the End of Economics as We Know It. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2392856: 1–19. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014b). The Three Fatal Mistakes of Yesterday Economics: Profit, I=S, Employment. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2489792: 1–13. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). How the Intelligent Non-Economist Can Refute Every Economist Hands Down. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2705395: 1–6. URL
Laidler, D. (1999). Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mill, J. S. (2006). A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, volume 8 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Moggridge, D. E. (1976). Keynes. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Popper, K. R. (1980). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, Melbourne, Sydney: Hutchison, 10th edition.
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL
Valentino, R. (1988). Discussion. In H. Hanusch (Ed.), Evolutionary Economics. Applications of Schumpeter’s Ideas, 238–249. Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press.
#1 Finalizing the Keynesian Revolution
Blog-Reference
It is trivial but worth repeating: political economics and theoretical economics are different things and have to be strictly kept apart. The core problem of economics as a science is, of course, that by its very nature it is closely entangled with politics. The biggest threat to theoretical economics is that it gets hijacked by those with a political agenda. It does not matter whether this agenda is good or bad in predefined moral terms. Science is committed to its own criteria or it ceases to be science.
But are we not all inescapably involved in the struggle between good and bad/evil? Politics, religion, and philosophy say so. But even if this were true, it cannot serve as a justification to hijack science or to let it be hijacked. What has to be recognized is that science is about true/false and not good/bad or like/dislike. This distinction is part of the demarcation problem, which is the fundamental problem of methodology (Popper, 1980, p. 34).
Keynes had a political agenda, and this was his first priority. Let us agree for the moment that his attempt to alleviate unemployment was good and right without any qualification. Hence we all can accept Keynes' agenda ― except for one point: Keynes used theoretical economics for political purposes. This is unacceptable.
“A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from certain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him for the decision.” (Mill, 2006, p. 950)
Having taken politics out of the way, the next question is about the scientific content of the General Theory. Here we can ― in very general terms ― side with Allais: “... mais son [Keynes'] insuffisance logique ne lui a pas permis de résoudre les problèmes que son intuition lui avait fait entrevoir.” (1993, p. 70) In other words, Keynes saw the problems but could not solve them due to a lack of logical consequences.
- “For, if anything, Keynes was the most intuitive of men.” (Moggridge, 1976, p. 33)
- “It is well known that John Maynard was born anew every morning; for this reason, his colleagues at Bretton Woods commented that he was too intelligent to be consistent.” (Valentino, 1988, p. 239)
- “But Keynes, too, sometimes gave the impression of not having fully grasped the logic of his own system.” (Laidler, 1999, p. 281)
With his comment on Hayek “... a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam. (Moggridge, 1976, p. 36) he won the everlasting sympathies of all who have their own troubles with logic.
In more specific terms we can definitively declare that the formal foundations of Keynesianism are logically defective since the General Theory. Keynes’ fundamental equations of macroeconomics, i.e. Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income – consumption. Therefore saving = investment, is indefensible. That is why Keynesianism is a failure (2011; 2014b).
The deeper reason is that Keynes ― just like his predecessors and fellows ― did not come to grips with profit.
“His Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the Profit Puzzle up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end he gave up and discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010, pp. 12-13, 16), see also (2014a; 2015)
It is no contradiction to acknowledge that Keynes was one of the good guys of political economics and not to accept the General Theory as a valid contribution to theoretical economics. Yet good intentions are not a scientific criterion, only material and formal consistency count. So what is left?
Keynes’ economic policy ideas were not exactly innovative. “Public works to relieve the unemployed is an idea as old as the Bible; ...” (Blaug, 1998, p. 662)
Keynes' lasting scientific contribution relates to methodology. He spoke it out loud so that every fellow economist could hear it: Throw over the classical axioms and put theoretical economics on new foundations. What else could Keynesian Revolution mean than a Paradigm Shift? Keynes pointed the way but could not follow it himself.#1
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Allais, M. (1993). Les Fondements Comptable de la Macro-Économie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd edition.
Blaug, M. (1998). Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014a). Mr. Keynes, Prof. Krugman, IS-LM, and the End of Economics as We Know It. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2392856: 1–19. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014b). The Three Fatal Mistakes of Yesterday Economics: Profit, I=S, Employment. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2489792: 1–13. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). How the Intelligent Non-Economist Can Refute Every Economist Hands Down. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2705395: 1–6. URL
Laidler, D. (1999). Fabricating the Keynesian Revolution. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Mill, J. S. (2006). A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, volume 8 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Moggridge, D. E. (1976). Keynes. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Popper, K. R. (1980). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London, Melbourne, Sydney: Hutchison, 10th edition.
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL
Valentino, R. (1988). Discussion. In H. Hanusch (Ed.), Evolutionary Economics. Applications of Schumpeter’s Ideas, 238–249. Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press.
#1 Finalizing the Keynesian Revolution
July 30, 2016
Economics: The chief demerit is inconsistency
Comment on Lars Syll on ‘How evidence is treated in modern macroeconomics’
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Aug 4
Scientists know it, but economists do not: “The chief demerit is inconsistency, including inconsistency with the results of experiments that a competing theory can explain.” (Popper, 1994, p. 160)
Scientists know it, but economists do not: “Research is, in fact, a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31)
So, science is about formal AND material consistency ― BOTH simultaneously, NOT either/or. The outstanding characteristic of economists is that they still think there is something to choose from: “Is it better to start deductively from axioms or inductively from facts? When the time comes to choose between internal consistency and consistency with observations, which side should we take? (Blinder, 1987, p. 135)
BOTH SIDES, blind Blinder! There is NO trade-off in science, neither between formal and material consistency nor between rigor and relevance nor between theory and practice. As Kant famously put it: “There is nothing so practical as a good theory.”
Needless to emphasize that the DSGE folks never got the pivotal point of methodology: “The unique property that DSGE models have is internal consistency. Take a DSGE model, and alter a few equations so that they fit the data much better, and you have what could be called a structural econometric model. It is internally inconsistent, but because it fits the data better it may be a better guide for policy.” (Wren-Lewis, see intro)
Never had methodological idiocy been expressed so clearly. Mind you, a theory that does not fit the data is falsified and has to be abandoned. Economists, though, do not abandon their proto-scientific garbage but desperately cling to it. This is the Original Sin: “In economics we should strive to proceed, wherever we can, exactly according to the standards of the other, more advanced, sciences, where it is not possible, once an issue has been decided, to continue to write about it as if nothing had happened.” (Morgenstern, 1941, p. 369)
The fact of the matter is that economics is a failed science. This is well-known among scientists but economists simply have no idea how to get out of the cul-de-sac: “And so ― faithful to the theory’s conceptual cornerstones and hoping against all hope that the unthinkable may still be achieved (i.e., a satisfactory theory of the price mechanism) ― the tormented upholders of the validity of the paradigmatic core of economic equilibrium theory appear singularly reluctant to face the problem of comparing expectations and results and assessing the consistency of the theory.” (Ingrao et al., 1990, p. 346)
One tends to think that Heterodoxy is methodologically superior to Orthodoxy, but this is not the case. Keynes, too, played material consistency against formal consistency: “... the brave army of heretics ..., who, following their intuitions, have preferred to see the truth obscurely and imperfectly rather than to maintain error, reached indeed with clearness and consistency and by easy logic but on hypotheses inappropriate to the facts.” (Keynes, 1973, p. 371)
Brave Post Keynesians echoed the master’s methodological kitsch with their silly motto: “... it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!” (Davidson, 1984, p. 574)
Roughly right is NOT a scientific criterion. Science is bivalently true/false with nothing in between. Roughly right = roughly wrong. Non-scientists, of course, are at home in the swamp of wish-wash and inconclusiveness between true and false, where anything goes and “nothing is clear and everything is possible.” (Keynes, 1973, p. 292)
It is a methodological tragicomedy that Keynes spotted the all-decisive point correctly: “For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.” (Keynes, 1973, p. xxi)
Krugman clearly spoke out about what the premises are: “... most of what I and many others do is sorta-kinda neoclassical because it takes the maximization-and-equilibrium world as a starting point.”
Like Keynes, Keen got the decisive point: “... real progress involves radically revising or even abandoning that starting point.” (Keen, 2011, p. 35)
Twisting, doctoring, and tampering with assumptions, equations, and/or data is NOT compatible with scientific standards. A Paradigm Shift is inevitable, which means in concrete and unmistakable terms: abandoning microfoundations. #1 And this is what Keynes attempted: he replaced microfoundations with macrofoundations. #2
Keynes, too, got it provably wrong, yet neither Keynesians nor Post-Keynesians nor New-Keynesians nor the Anti-Keynesians ever spotted the logical inconsistency in Keynes’s macrofoundations. Not very profound thinkers these Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, and Austrian folks. There is NO hope that these dilettantish orthodox or heterodox economists will ever understand what the unity of formal AND material consistency means (2013). #3 After all, they did not get it in the last 200+ years. There is only one option left: to expel economics as we know it from the sciences.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Blinder, A. S. (1987). Keynes, Lucas, and Scientific Progress. American Economic Review, 77(2): 130–136. URL
Davidson, P. (1984). Reviving Keynes’s Revolution. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 6(4): 561–575. URL
Ingrao, B., and Israel, G. (1990). The Invisible Hand. Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science. Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Confused Confusers: How to Stop Thinking Like an Economist and Start Thinking Like a Scientist. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2207598: 1–16. URL
Keen, S. (2011). Debunking Economics. London, New York: Zed Books, rev. edition.
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Morgenstern, O. (1941). Professor Hicks on Value and Capital. Journal of Political Economy, 49(3): 361–393. URL
Popper, K. R. (1994). The Myth of the Framework. In Defence of Science and Rationality, chapter Models, Instruments, and Truth, 154–184. London, New York: Routledge.
#1 Orthodoxy is built upon this set of hardcore propositions, a.k.a. premises, a.k.a. starting point, a.k.a. axioms: “HC1 economic agents have preferences over outcomes; HC2 agents individually optimize subject to constraints; HC3 agent choice is manifest in interrelated markets; HC4 agents have full relevant knowledge; HC5 observable outcomes are coordinated, and must be discussed with reference to equilibrium states.” (Weintraub, 1985)
#2 Keynesianism is built upon this set of foundational propositions: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (Keynes, 1973, 63)
#3 For more details and references, see The problem with macro in two words.
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Aug 4
Scientists know it, but economists do not: “The chief demerit is inconsistency, including inconsistency with the results of experiments that a competing theory can explain.” (Popper, 1994, p. 160)
Scientists know it, but economists do not: “Research is, in fact, a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31)
So, science is about formal AND material consistency ― BOTH simultaneously, NOT either/or. The outstanding characteristic of economists is that they still think there is something to choose from: “Is it better to start deductively from axioms or inductively from facts? When the time comes to choose between internal consistency and consistency with observations, which side should we take? (Blinder, 1987, p. 135)
BOTH SIDES, blind Blinder! There is NO trade-off in science, neither between formal and material consistency nor between rigor and relevance nor between theory and practice. As Kant famously put it: “There is nothing so practical as a good theory.”
Needless to emphasize that the DSGE folks never got the pivotal point of methodology: “The unique property that DSGE models have is internal consistency. Take a DSGE model, and alter a few equations so that they fit the data much better, and you have what could be called a structural econometric model. It is internally inconsistent, but because it fits the data better it may be a better guide for policy.” (Wren-Lewis, see intro)
Never had methodological idiocy been expressed so clearly. Mind you, a theory that does not fit the data is falsified and has to be abandoned. Economists, though, do not abandon their proto-scientific garbage but desperately cling to it. This is the Original Sin: “In economics we should strive to proceed, wherever we can, exactly according to the standards of the other, more advanced, sciences, where it is not possible, once an issue has been decided, to continue to write about it as if nothing had happened.” (Morgenstern, 1941, p. 369)
The fact of the matter is that economics is a failed science. This is well-known among scientists but economists simply have no idea how to get out of the cul-de-sac: “And so ― faithful to the theory’s conceptual cornerstones and hoping against all hope that the unthinkable may still be achieved (i.e., a satisfactory theory of the price mechanism) ― the tormented upholders of the validity of the paradigmatic core of economic equilibrium theory appear singularly reluctant to face the problem of comparing expectations and results and assessing the consistency of the theory.” (Ingrao et al., 1990, p. 346)
One tends to think that Heterodoxy is methodologically superior to Orthodoxy, but this is not the case. Keynes, too, played material consistency against formal consistency: “... the brave army of heretics ..., who, following their intuitions, have preferred to see the truth obscurely and imperfectly rather than to maintain error, reached indeed with clearness and consistency and by easy logic but on hypotheses inappropriate to the facts.” (Keynes, 1973, p. 371)
Brave Post Keynesians echoed the master’s methodological kitsch with their silly motto: “... it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!” (Davidson, 1984, p. 574)
Roughly right is NOT a scientific criterion. Science is bivalently true/false with nothing in between. Roughly right = roughly wrong. Non-scientists, of course, are at home in the swamp of wish-wash and inconclusiveness between true and false, where anything goes and “nothing is clear and everything is possible.” (Keynes, 1973, p. 292)
It is a methodological tragicomedy that Keynes spotted the all-decisive point correctly: “For if orthodox economics is at fault, the error is to be found not in the superstructure, which has been erected with great care for logical consistency, but in a lack of clearness and of generality in the premises.” (Keynes, 1973, p. xxi)
Krugman clearly spoke out about what the premises are: “... most of what I and many others do is sorta-kinda neoclassical because it takes the maximization-and-equilibrium world as a starting point.”
Like Keynes, Keen got the decisive point: “... real progress involves radically revising or even abandoning that starting point.” (Keen, 2011, p. 35)
Twisting, doctoring, and tampering with assumptions, equations, and/or data is NOT compatible with scientific standards. A Paradigm Shift is inevitable, which means in concrete and unmistakable terms: abandoning microfoundations. #1 And this is what Keynes attempted: he replaced microfoundations with macrofoundations. #2
Keynes, too, got it provably wrong, yet neither Keynesians nor Post-Keynesians nor New-Keynesians nor the Anti-Keynesians ever spotted the logical inconsistency in Keynes’s macrofoundations. Not very profound thinkers these Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, and Austrian folks. There is NO hope that these dilettantish orthodox or heterodox economists will ever understand what the unity of formal AND material consistency means (2013). #3 After all, they did not get it in the last 200+ years. There is only one option left: to expel economics as we know it from the sciences.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Blinder, A. S. (1987). Keynes, Lucas, and Scientific Progress. American Economic Review, 77(2): 130–136. URL
Davidson, P. (1984). Reviving Keynes’s Revolution. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 6(4): 561–575. URL
Ingrao, B., and Israel, G. (1990). The Invisible Hand. Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science. Cambridge, London: MIT Press.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Confused Confusers: How to Stop Thinking Like an Economist and Start Thinking Like a Scientist. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2207598: 1–16. URL
Keen, S. (2011). Debunking Economics. London, New York: Zed Books, rev. edition.
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.
Morgenstern, O. (1941). Professor Hicks on Value and Capital. Journal of Political Economy, 49(3): 361–393. URL
Popper, K. R. (1994). The Myth of the Framework. In Defence of Science and Rationality, chapter Models, Instruments, and Truth, 154–184. London, New York: Routledge.
#1 Orthodoxy is built upon this set of hardcore propositions, a.k.a. premises, a.k.a. starting point, a.k.a. axioms: “HC1 economic agents have preferences over outcomes; HC2 agents individually optimize subject to constraints; HC3 agent choice is manifest in interrelated markets; HC4 agents have full relevant knowledge; HC5 observable outcomes are coordinated, and must be discussed with reference to equilibrium states.” (Weintraub, 1985)
#2 Keynesianism is built upon this set of foundational propositions: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (Keynes, 1973, 63)
#3 For more details and references, see The problem with macro in two words.
July 28, 2016
Economic policy guidance out of the scientific kindergarten
Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Austerity policies — nothing but kindergarten economics’
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference
Lars Syll quotes Kalecki asking this question: “The entrepreneurs in the slump are longing for a boom; why do they not gladly accept the synthetic boom which the government is able to offer them?”
And he quotes also the answer: “But once the government learns the trick of increasing employment by its own purchases, this powerful controlling device loses its effectiveness. Hence, budget deficits necessary to carry out government intervention must be regarded as perilous. The social function of the doctrine of ‘sound finance’ is to make the level of employment dependent on the state of confidence.”
This is a fine example of Political Economics. A political explanation consists of speculative mind-reading and the triumphant exposure of the ‘true’ motive of the other fellow, which turns out to be crass self-interest in the best case or something far worse in all others. Schumpeter characterized the intellectual kindergarten of Political Economics as follows: “It is only our inability to divorce research from politics, or our suspicion, all too often justified, that the other fellow cannot analyze with single-minded devotion to truth, which makes problems and party issues out of decisions that do not excite anyone in more fortunate fields of research.” (1994, p. 566)
Needless to emphasize that from the intellectual kindergarten of Political Economics, not much, if anything, of scientific value ever emerged. Economics is a failed science. Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, and Austrianism are provably false. Science, or Theoretical Economics in contradistinction to Political Economics, is the “single-minded devotion to truth” which, in turn, is well-defined as material and formal consistency. Theoretical Economics refrains from speculative mind-reading, motive imputation, and storytelling.
The very characteristic of the agenda pushers of Political Economics is that they are either ignorant of scientific standards or simply trample them underfoot. “As some one has said, it would seem that even the theorems of Euclid would be challenged and doubted if they should be appealed to by one political party as against another.” (Fisher, 1911, PF. 6)
The real problem of the austerity discussion is this. Neoclassical employment theory is provably false. Keynes’s employment theory is a great step in the right direction, but only half-true because Keynes never came to grips with profit (2012). The same holds for Kalecki (2011).
So, neither orthodox nor Keynesian nor Kaleckian policy proposals with regard to employment/austerity/sound finance have a valid scientific foundation. In Political Economics, there is a TOTAL DISCONNECT between an economic policy proposal and the underlying theory. Economic theory is worthless and only puts some pseudo-scientific lipstick on the political pig.
The Political Economics of traditional Heterodoxy is not better than that of Orthodoxy. ALL Political Economics is scientific garbage.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Fisher, I. (1911). The Purchasing Power of Money. Its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest, and Crises. Library of Economics and Liberty. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). What is Wrong With Heterodox Economics? Kalecki’s Profit Theory as an Example. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1845803: 1–9. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). Keynes’s Employment Function and the Gratuitous Phillips Curve Disaster. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2130421: 1–19. URL
Schumpeter, J. A. (1994). History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference
Lars Syll quotes Kalecki asking this question: “The entrepreneurs in the slump are longing for a boom; why do they not gladly accept the synthetic boom which the government is able to offer them?”
And he quotes also the answer: “But once the government learns the trick of increasing employment by its own purchases, this powerful controlling device loses its effectiveness. Hence, budget deficits necessary to carry out government intervention must be regarded as perilous. The social function of the doctrine of ‘sound finance’ is to make the level of employment dependent on the state of confidence.”
This is a fine example of Political Economics. A political explanation consists of speculative mind-reading and the triumphant exposure of the ‘true’ motive of the other fellow, which turns out to be crass self-interest in the best case or something far worse in all others. Schumpeter characterized the intellectual kindergarten of Political Economics as follows: “It is only our inability to divorce research from politics, or our suspicion, all too often justified, that the other fellow cannot analyze with single-minded devotion to truth, which makes problems and party issues out of decisions that do not excite anyone in more fortunate fields of research.” (1994, p. 566)
Needless to emphasize that from the intellectual kindergarten of Political Economics, not much, if anything, of scientific value ever emerged. Economics is a failed science. Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, and Austrianism are provably false. Science, or Theoretical Economics in contradistinction to Political Economics, is the “single-minded devotion to truth” which, in turn, is well-defined as material and formal consistency. Theoretical Economics refrains from speculative mind-reading, motive imputation, and storytelling.
The very characteristic of the agenda pushers of Political Economics is that they are either ignorant of scientific standards or simply trample them underfoot. “As some one has said, it would seem that even the theorems of Euclid would be challenged and doubted if they should be appealed to by one political party as against another.” (Fisher, 1911, PF. 6)
The real problem of the austerity discussion is this. Neoclassical employment theory is provably false. Keynes’s employment theory is a great step in the right direction, but only half-true because Keynes never came to grips with profit (2012). The same holds for Kalecki (2011).
So, neither orthodox nor Keynesian nor Kaleckian policy proposals with regard to employment/austerity/sound finance have a valid scientific foundation. In Political Economics, there is a TOTAL DISCONNECT between an economic policy proposal and the underlying theory. Economic theory is worthless and only puts some pseudo-scientific lipstick on the political pig.
The Political Economics of traditional Heterodoxy is not better than that of Orthodoxy. ALL Political Economics is scientific garbage.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Fisher, I. (1911). The Purchasing Power of Money. Its Determination and Relation to Credit, Interest, and Crises. Library of Economics and Liberty. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). What is Wrong With Heterodox Economics? Kalecki’s Profit Theory as an Example. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1845803: 1–9. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). Keynes’s Employment Function and the Gratuitous Phillips Curve Disaster. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2130421: 1–19. URL
Schumpeter, J. A. (1994). History of Economic Analysis. New York: Oxford University Press.
July 21, 2016
Substandard reasoners
Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Why economists can’t reason’
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Jul 22
The simple fact is that about one percent of the population can reason. The rest merely recycles stories of different degrees of absurdity according to Tertullian’s motto, ‘Credo quia absurdum est’. #1 Unfortunately, economics has been done since Adam Smith by the ninety-nine-percenters. This happened because “... we can never make sure that the right man will be attracted to scientific research.” (Popper, 1960, p. 157)
The failure of economics proves that it has been particularly attractive for substandard reasoners.
Science is special because it is the systematic attempt to establish truth, which in turn is well-defined by material AND formal consistency. Scientific truth is double-checked; everything else is storytelling.
About the logical part, Scriven says: “Reasoning is the process whereby we get from old truths to new truths, from the known to the unknown, from the accepted to the debatable … If the reasoning starts on firm ground, and if it is itself sound, then it will lead to a conclusion which we must accept, though previously, perhaps, we had not thought we should.” (See intro)
The key term is “firm ground” or, as Aristotle put it, “When the premises are certain, true, and primary, and the conclusion formally follows from them, this is demonstration, and produces scientific knowledge of a thing.” #2
Scientific methodology is old stuff for more than 2300 years, but economists have never been able to get their heads around it.
What does the “firm ground” of economics look like? Standard economics is built upon this set of foundational propositions, a.k.a. axioms: “HC1 economic agents have preferences over outcomes; HC2 agents individually optimize subject to constraints; HC3 agent choice is manifest in interrelated markets; HC4 agents have full relevant knowledge; HC5 observable outcomes are coordinated, and must be discussed with reference to equilibrium states.” (Weintraub, 1985, p. 147)
With this “firm ground,” sound logical thinking with iron necessity arrives eventually in a parallel universe. Clearly, with manifest NONENTITIES in the premises, the inevitable outcome is a bubbling angels-on-a-pinpoint discourse. The real question is why so many economists could ever accept HC1 to HC5. Obviously, the motto ‘Credo quia absurdum est’ applies as ever and has only to be translated into modern English as ‘You can sell any crap to an economist’. #3
The curious thing is that there is no difference between orthodox and heterodox economists in this respect. What is, in fact, different between them is the color of their methodological tinfoil hats. Orthodoxy says HC1 to HC5 is firm ground, and Heterodoxy subscribes to anything-goes or optionally to nothing-goes.
Scientists have always known one crucial thing about firm ground: “We are lost in a swamp, the morass of our ignorance. ... We have to find the roots and get ourselves out! ... Braids or bootstraps are necessary for two purposes: to pull ourselves out of the swamp and, afterwards, to keep our bits and pieces together in an orderly fashion.” (Schmiechen, 2009, p. 11)
In order to pull themselves out of the swamp, economists have to replace the microfoundations HC1 to HC5 with macrofoundations. There is no hope at all that the old swampies can do the trick.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Popper, K. R. (1960). The Poverty of Historicism. London, Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Schmiechen, M. (2009). Newton’s Principia and Related ‘Principles’ Revisited, volume 1. Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2nd edition. URL
Weintraub, E. R. (1985). Joan Robinson’s Critique of Equilibrium: An Appraisal. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 75(2): 146–149. URL
#1 Wikipedia Credo quia absurdum
#2 Wikipedia Posterior Analytics
#3 Mental messies and loose losers
Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Jul 22
The simple fact is that about one percent of the population can reason. The rest merely recycles stories of different degrees of absurdity according to Tertullian’s motto, ‘Credo quia absurdum est’. #1 Unfortunately, economics has been done since Adam Smith by the ninety-nine-percenters. This happened because “... we can never make sure that the right man will be attracted to scientific research.” (Popper, 1960, p. 157)
The failure of economics proves that it has been particularly attractive for substandard reasoners.
Science is special because it is the systematic attempt to establish truth, which in turn is well-defined by material AND formal consistency. Scientific truth is double-checked; everything else is storytelling.
About the logical part, Scriven says: “Reasoning is the process whereby we get from old truths to new truths, from the known to the unknown, from the accepted to the debatable … If the reasoning starts on firm ground, and if it is itself sound, then it will lead to a conclusion which we must accept, though previously, perhaps, we had not thought we should.” (See intro)
The key term is “firm ground” or, as Aristotle put it, “When the premises are certain, true, and primary, and the conclusion formally follows from them, this is demonstration, and produces scientific knowledge of a thing.” #2
Scientific methodology is old stuff for more than 2300 years, but economists have never been able to get their heads around it.
What does the “firm ground” of economics look like? Standard economics is built upon this set of foundational propositions, a.k.a. axioms: “HC1 economic agents have preferences over outcomes; HC2 agents individually optimize subject to constraints; HC3 agent choice is manifest in interrelated markets; HC4 agents have full relevant knowledge; HC5 observable outcomes are coordinated, and must be discussed with reference to equilibrium states.” (Weintraub, 1985, p. 147)
With this “firm ground,” sound logical thinking with iron necessity arrives eventually in a parallel universe. Clearly, with manifest NONENTITIES in the premises, the inevitable outcome is a bubbling angels-on-a-pinpoint discourse. The real question is why so many economists could ever accept HC1 to HC5. Obviously, the motto ‘Credo quia absurdum est’ applies as ever and has only to be translated into modern English as ‘You can sell any crap to an economist’. #3
The curious thing is that there is no difference between orthodox and heterodox economists in this respect. What is, in fact, different between them is the color of their methodological tinfoil hats. Orthodoxy says HC1 to HC5 is firm ground, and Heterodoxy subscribes to anything-goes or optionally to nothing-goes.
Scientists have always known one crucial thing about firm ground: “We are lost in a swamp, the morass of our ignorance. ... We have to find the roots and get ourselves out! ... Braids or bootstraps are necessary for two purposes: to pull ourselves out of the swamp and, afterwards, to keep our bits and pieces together in an orderly fashion.” (Schmiechen, 2009, p. 11)
In order to pull themselves out of the swamp, economists have to replace the microfoundations HC1 to HC5 with macrofoundations. There is no hope at all that the old swampies can do the trick.
Egmont Kakarot-Handtke
References
Popper, K. R. (1960). The Poverty of Historicism. London, Henley: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
Schmiechen, M. (2009). Newton’s Principia and Related ‘Principles’ Revisited, volume 1. Norderstedt: Books on Demand, 2nd edition. URL
Weintraub, E. R. (1985). Joan Robinson’s Critique of Equilibrium: An Appraisal. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 75(2): 146–149. URL
#1 Wikipedia Credo quia absurdum
#2 Wikipedia Posterior Analytics
#3 Mental messies and loose losers
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