September 17, 2016

Micro and macro inconsistency

Comment on Jo Michell on ‘Consistent modelling and inconsistent terminology’

Blog-Reference

“Research is, in fact, a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994, p. 31)

Economics is a failed science because Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, and Austrianism are provably inconsistent. This includes Godley’s and Lavoie’s approach. More precisely, Godley’s and Lavoie’s program ― the integrated approach to credit, money, income, production, and wealth ― is basically correct, but at some point, an inconsistency slipped in, and that happened exactly in Section 8.2, p. 262 (Godley et al., 2007).

The inconsistency relates to the definitions of profit (monetary, nonmonetary), distributed profit, retained profit, total income, and the definition of total saving (monetary, nonmonetary). Roughly speaking, monetary profit results from objectively measurable market transactions, nonmonetary profit results from the highly subjective valuation of assets, and these are totally different things (2011b).

The problem of the accounting approach is twofold: (i) as a rule, economists do not understand the elementary mathematics that underlies accounting, which leads to an inconsistent definition of total income and GDP (2012), (ii) the approach is axiomatically incomplete because it defines only the relationships of nominal variables.

All purely nominal models, as well as all purely real models, are false because the economy constitutes itself through the interaction of real AND nominal variables. Therefore, the methodologically correct framework is given by — what Keynes called — the ‘monetary theory of production’.

The overall failure of economics lies in the fact that economists argue from false premises/axioms, that is, Walrasianism in all shapes and forms (DSGE, RBC, AD/AS, etc.) argues from forever unacceptable microfoundations, and Keynesianism in all shapes and forms argues from false macrofoundations. To get out of failed economics requires nothing less than a Paradigm Shift from inconsistent to consistent foundations/axioms.

The correct macrofoundations are shown under the label AXEC137b.


Post/New/After-Keynesians have not realized until this very day that Keynes had messed up the formal foundations of the General Theory (1973, p. 63). The fatal flaw of Keynes’s and Godley’s/Lavoie’s approach is that the underlying profit theory is false (2011a). Clearly, if one gets the foundational concept of economics wrong, all the rest of one’s theory is worthless. The present state of economics is that neither the microfounded Walrasians nor the macrofounded Keynesians have a formally and materially consistent theory of how the market economy works. Because of this, economic policy guidance has ― for more than 200 years ― zero scientific content. This also applies to the shop talk of Jo and Simon.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Godley, W., and Lavoie, M. (2007). Monetary Economics. An Integrated Approach to Credit, Money, Income and Wealth. Houndmills, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011a). The Emergence of Profit and Interest in the Monetary Circuit. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1973952: 1–22. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011b). Primary and Secondary Markets. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1917012: 1–26. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). The Common Error of Common Sense: An Essential Rectification of the Accounting Approach. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2124415: 1–23. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Klant, J. J. (1994). The Nature of Economic Thought. Aldershot, Brookfield: Edward Elgar.

September 15, 2016

Soapbox economics

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘But not as wrong as Paul Krugman …’

Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Sep 16

Lars Syll correctly summarizes: “Dani Rodrik — just like Paul Krugman — does often take a ‘radical’ stance on different policy issues. But when it comes to core theoretical and methodological issues, he — just like Paul Krugman — is a self-proclaimed and proud die-hard mainstream neoclassical economist.”

The curious thing about economics is that there is a total DISCONNECT between an economic policy proposal and the underlying theory. Just as there has been a total disconnect between poultry entrails and the utterances of the haruspex, which guided ancient Roman policy. In other words, economic policy guidance has NO sound scientific foundation at all. This holds for Neoclassicals, Keynesians, Marxians, and Austrians in equal measure. All these approaches are provably inconsistent. #1

Economics consists of political and theoretical economics, and both are disconnected. Political economics has been scientifically worthless for more than 200 years. There is nothing to choose between Rodrik, Krugman, or King.

As Lars Syll says: “People who really want to develop alternatives ... have to look elsewhere.” #2

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


#1 Keynesianism: The triumph of blathering over thinking.
#2 For details of the big picture, see cross-references Paradigm Shift.

Related 'Krugman is not an economist' and 'Economics: The Battle of Frogs and Mice is over' and 'From Orthodoxy to Heterodoxy to Metadoxy'

Marshall and the Cambridge School of plain economic gibberish

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Proper use of math’

Blog-Reference

“The currently prevailing pattern of economic theorizing exhibits the following three characteristics: (1) a syncopated style of argument fluctuating back and forth between literary and symbolic modes of expression, (2) naive translation, or the loose paraphrasing of formulae into sentences, and (3) loose verbal reasoning for certain aspects of theoretical argumentation where explicit symbolic formulation is lacking.” (Dennis, 1982, p. 698)

As many have noted, current economics in the incarnation of Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, and Austrianism is not science but gibberish decorated with more or less mathematics. How did we get stuck in this bottomless swamp?

To make the world we live in understandable to ourselves, we have not only myth and science but also common sense ― uneasily sitting between the two. John Stuart Mill had no friendly word for common sense: “People fancied they saw the sun rise and set, the stars revolve in circles round the pole. We now know that they saw no such thing; what they really saw was a set of appearances, equally reconcileable with the theory they held and with a totally different one. It seems strange that such an instance as this, ..., should not have opened the eyes of the bigots of common sense, and inspired them with a more modest distrust of the competency of mere ignorance to judge the conclusions of cultivated thought.” (2006, p. 783)

The message that common sense is not merely a huge obstacle to science but its very ANTITHESIS got lost on Keynes. Before starting work on the General Theory, he had made up his mind: “In the early thirties he confessed to Roy Harrod that he was ‘returning to an age-long tradition of common sense’.” (Coates, 2007, p. 11)

Now, economics deals not only with individuals and social relations but the economic system as a whole, and Keynes had to come to grips with ‘definitions and ideas’. In fact, he did not. He spent an immense amount of his time on Book II ‘and still left his successors in confusion’ (Moggridge, 1976, p. 33).

Being more an agenda pusher than a scientist, Keynes, like Marshall before him, had the ambition to gain the applause of the practical man, the politician, the businessman, and the general public represented by the business journalist ― however, without ever giving up the appearance of a scientist. “By choosing definitions on the ground that they correspond with actual usage Keynes was formulating an ordinary language social science, one that bears a resemblance to those argued for by philosophers of hermeneutics.” (Coates, 2007, p. 90)

Keynes related his definition of income expressly to ‘the practices of the Income Tax Commissioners.’ He was in grave doubt whether ‘it might be better to employ the term windfalls for what I call profits.’ But he was quite sure that ‘saving and investment are, necessarily and by definition, equal ― which after all, is in full harmony with common sense and the common usage of the world.’ (Keynes, quoted in Coates, 2007, pp. 93, 91)

As a result, the opportunistic commonsenser Keynes never arrived at a clear idea of the fundamental economic concepts of income and profit, and he knew it: “His Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the Profit Puzzle up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end he gave up and discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010, pp. 12-13, 16)

In the discussions following the publication of the General Theory, Keynes had ‘no desire’ that the particular forms of his ‘comparatively simple fundamental ideas ... should be crystallized at the present state of the debate’ (cited in Rotheim, 1981,  p. 571). Keynes kept the discussion within the compass of common sense, where ‘nothing is clear and everything is possible’. (1973, p. 292)

Keynes followed the philosophically well-established Cambridge tradition of loose verbal reasoning: “Another danger is that you may ‘precise everything away’ and be left with only a comparative poverty of meaning. ... Such a problem was avoided, said Keynes, by Marshall who used loose definitions but allowed the reader to infer his meaning from ‘the richness of context.’” (Coates, 2007, p. 87)

This spurious freedom of reading into the GT or out of it whatever seemed convenient led to the vacuous discussion of “what Keynes really meant” and the phenomenon that virtually everybody can call himself a Keynesian. This, though, did not help much: “Looking back over the last 70 years it is an inescapable fact that the theoretical arm of the Keynesian Revolution never got off the ground.” (Rogers, 2010, p. 152)

Like Walrasianism, Keynesianism is a failed approach. But both still have some application as a scientific fig leaf in politics, which explains their zombie-like survival.

The Cambridge tradition, continual failure notwithstanding, still holds the majority of retarded economists: “For Keynes as for Post Keynesians the guiding motto is ‘it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!’” (Davidson, 1984, p. 574). This contrasts with the motto of science: “It is better to be precisely right than roughly wrong!”

The methodological debate between rigorous Orthodoxy and loose Heterodoxy quite naturally ended in the cul-de-sac: “Mathematical economics, it seems, had the great virtue of demonstrable irrelevance, which was morally preferable to spurious relevance.” (Porter, 1994, p. 155)

The fact of the matter is that both Orthodoxy and Heterodoxy got the foundational concepts wrong. Without consistent conceptual foundations, though, economics will never get out of the self-made thickness of confusion: “I mean by this that formalization eliminates provincial and inessential features of the way in which a scientific theory has been thought about. ... Formalization is a way of setting off from the forest of implicit assumptions and the surrounding thickness of confusion, the ground that is required for the theory being considered. ... In areas of science where great controversy exists about even the most elementary concepts, the value of such formalization can be substantial.” (Suppes, 1968, pp. 654-655)

Formalization is indispensable in economics but presupposes clarifying elementary concepts. With vacuous concepts/NONENTITIES formalization degenerates to mathiness. There is nothing to choose between Keynesian loose verbal reasoning and Walrasian mathiness.

Economists of ALL schools have messed up the foundational concepts of profit and income. With Marshall and Keynes as leading spokesmen, the Cambridge School of Loose Verbal Reasoning is an outstanding example of utter scientific incompetence to this day.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Coates, J. (2007). The Claims of Common Sense. Moore, Wittgenstein, Keynes and the Social Sciences. Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press.
Davidson, P. (1984). Reviving Keynes’s Revolution. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 6(4): 561–575. URL
Dennis, K. (1982). Economic Theory and the Problem of Translation (I). Journal of Economic Issues, 16(3): 691–712. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Mill, J. S. (2006). A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, Vol. 8 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Moggridge, D. E. (1976). Keynes. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Porter, T. M. (1994). Rigor and Practicality: Rival Ideals of Quantification in Nineteenth-Century Economics. In P. Mirowski (Ed.), Natural Images in Economic Thought, 128–170. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Rogers, C. (2010). The Principle of Effective Demand: The Key to Understanding the General Theory. In R. W. Dimand, R. A. Mundell, and A. Vercelli (Eds.), Keynes’s General Theory after Seventy Years, IEA Conference Vol.147, 136–156. Houndmills, Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Rotheim, R. J. (1981). Keynes’ Monetary Theory of Value (1933). Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 3(4): 568–585. URL
Suppes, P. (1968). The Desirability of Formalization in Science. Journal of Philosophy, 65(20): 651–664.
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL

Related 'Keynesianism: The triumph of blathering over thinking' and 'How Keynes got macro wrong and Allais got it right' and 'Economists and the destructive power of stupidity' and 'Economics ― worse than fake'. For details of the big picture, see cross-references Failed/Fake Scientists and cross-references Math/Mathiness and cross-references Marshall and 'Links on Alfred Marshall' and cross-references Paradigm Shift.

***

September 13, 2016

Keynesianism: The triumph of blathering over thinking

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Dark age of macroeconomics’

Blog-Reference

Walrasianism in all shapes and forms (DSGE, RBC, AD/AS, etc.) argues from unacceptable microfoundations, and Keynesianism in all shapes and forms argues from false macrofoundations. To get out of failed economics requires nothing less than a Paradigm Shift to true macrofoundations. For the roadmap, see Graphic AXEC85.

Keynes founded macroeconomics on logically and conceptually defective foundations, and neither Post Keynesians nor New Keynesians nor Anti-Keynesians have realized Keynes’ foundational blunder in 80+ years (2014).

Keynes defined the formal core of the General Theory as follows “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)

This syllogism is defective because Keynes never came to grips with profit “His Collected Writings show that he wrestled to solve the Profit Puzzle up till the semi-final versions of his GT but in the end he gave up and discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010, p. 12)

Let this sink in, Keynes had NO idea of the fundamental concepts of economics, viz., profit and income. Because profit is ill-defined, the whole theoretical superstructure of macroeconomics is false, in particular, ALL I=S/IS-LM models (2011; 2013).

The axiomatically correct macroeconomic Profit Law reads Qm≡Yd+I−Sm (2014, p. 8, eq. (18)).  Legend: Qm monetary profit, Yd distributed profit, Sm monetary saving, I investment expenditures. It is pretty obvious from this equation that investment I and saving Sm are NEVER equal, neither ex-ante nor ex-post, and this has NOTHING to do with the question of how investment is financed. The argument that I=S is merely an accounting identity proves only that economists are too stupid to understand the elementary mathematics of accounting (2012).

The Profit Law gets a bit longer when import/export and government are included.

Bottom line: Saving Sm and investment I develop INDEPENDENTLY. There is NO such thing as an interest mechanism that equalizes investment and saving. It is neither true that saving ‘causes’ investment as the Classicals claimed nor that investment determines saving via the multiplier as Keynes claimed. The perpetual difference between investment I and saving Sm is the main determinant of profit Qm. BOTH the Classicals and Keynes got the profit theory wrong. Nothing is more disqualifying for an economist.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Squaring the Investment Cycle. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1911796: 1–25. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). The Common Error of Common Sense: An Essential Rectification of the Accounting Approach. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2124415: 1–23. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Settling the Theory of Saving. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2220651: 1–23. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014). The Three Fatal Mistakes of Yesterday Economics: Profit, I=S, Employment. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2489792: 1–13. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL

Related ‘I=S: Mark of the Incompetent’ and 'I is never equal S and even Nick Rowe will eventually grasp it' and 'Wikipedia and the promotion of economists’ idiotism (II)' and 'Macroeconomics: Economists are too stupid for science'.

***
Graphic AXEC121i

Clueless about money and profit

Comment on David Glasner on ‘Helicopter Money and the Reflux Problem’

Blog-Reference

Not only humans but animals, too, know how to use levers of all forms and sizes since time immemorial. And it is certainly possible to write a history of the use of levers from the Stone Age to the Egyptians and beyond. However, this history of the practical use of levers will NEVER arrive at the Law of the Lever as put down by Archimedes.

Obviously, there are different views of the lever: the practical, the historico-genetic, and the scientific. The fact of the matter is that roughly 99 percent of people use the lever without any understanding of the essence/principle/nature of the lever, which is ABSTRACT and INDEPENDENT of concrete historical time/space. Only one percent of scientists really understand the lever.

The same holds for economic phenomena like money or debt. We have a commonsensical history of money and the theory of money. Actually, we do NOT have a valid theory of money. What we have is Walrasianism, Keynesianism, Marxianism, and Austrianism, and all four approaches are provably false, that is, materially and formally inconsistent. Put in methodological terms, the axiomatic foundations of the four approaches are false, and this means that the whole analytical superstructure is false, even if each intermediate logical step is correct. In short, economics is a failed science, and this includes, of course, the theory of money.

From this follows: “For it can fairly be insisted that no advance in the elegance and comprehensiveness of the theoretical superstructure can make up for the vague and uncritical formulation of the basic concepts and postulates, and sooner or later ... attention will have to return to the foundations.” (Hutchison, 1960, p. 5). What is needed is a Paradigm Shift, or as Joan Robinson put it: “Scrap the lot and start again.”

It is pretty obvious that the discussion about helicopter money suffers from the fact that each participant has a different model of the economy at the back of his mind. Lacking a common workhorse model, the natural result is ongoing confused blather that forever remains inconclusive. Make no mistake, though, inconclusive confusion is where the representative economist is most at home: “I find I’m learning so much from the back and forth on this issue (both from Nick and David plus related posts like this one) ― I hope they never resolve it!” #1

This is the very difference between the economist and the scientist: the economist is happy with a never-ending inconclusive wish-wash, the scientist is happy with a provably true/false conclusion.

So, let us, first of all, define common ground. (A0) The most elementary configuration of the economy consists of the household and the business sector which in turn consists initially of one giant fully integrated firm and is given by these three objective structural axioms: (A1) Yw=WL wage income Yw is equal to wage rate W times working hours L, (A2) O=RL output O is equal to productivity R times working hours L, (A3) C=PX consumption expenditure C is equal to price P times quantity bought/sold X (for details see 2015; 2014; 2011).

The first mistake is to think of money as a given stock. That is historically true but analytically false. The very characteristic of transaction money is that it is permanently created and destroyed.

In order to reduce the monetary phenomena to the essentials, it is supposed that all money transactions are carried out by the central bank. The household and business sector’s respective stock of money then takes the form of current deposits or current overdrafts.

By sequencing the initially given period length of one year into sub-periods, one gets a simple pattern of wage payments and consumption expenditures. #2 It is assumed here that the monthly income Yw/12 is paid out at mid-month. In the first half of the month, the daily spending of Yw/360 increases the current overdrafts of the households. At mid-month, the households change to the positive side and have current deposits of Yw/24 at their disposal. This amount reduces continuously towards the end of the month. This pattern is exactly repeated over the rest of the year. At the end of each sub-period, and therefore also at the end of the year, the household sector’s stock of money is ZERO. Money is present and absent depending on the time frame of observation. The reflux is perfect due to the fact that C=Yw for the given period.

Seen from the central bank, the income-expenditure pattern gives rise to an AVERAGE stock of transaction money which is here proportional to the period income Yw. #3

In period 2, the wage rate and the price are doubled. Since no cash balances are carried forward from one period to the next, there is no real balance effect provided the doubling takes place precisely at the beginning of period 2. If employment L is doubled, income Yw and output O doubles and under the condition of C=Yw and R=const. The market-clearing price P remains constant. In the first case, there is a correlation between price and average stock of money in the second case not. The quantity of money is NOT causal for the market-clearing price as the commonplace quantity theory claims. Under the condition that the central bank is passive, i.e., that it accommodates the autonomous transactions between the household and business sectors, there is perfect reflux. The stock of money is zero at the beginning and the end of each period.

Things change when the household sector saves or dissaves, i.e., when C is no longer equal to Yw. In this case, there is no perfect reflux, and money morphs from a pure transaction medium into a store of value. This uno actu creates a new economic phenomenon, viz., profit/loss for the economy as a whole. The details are an issue for another occasion.

The point that is ENTIRELY OVERLOOKED in the usual treatment of saving/dissaving/money/ credit/reflux is the effect on overall profit. Put bluntly: helicopter money is the best profit machine ever invented. So nobody should be surprised about massive distributional distortions as collateral damage.#4

Conclusion: A representative economist is a person who filibusters about the monetary economy without any idea about the two most important phenomena of his subject matter, viz., money and profit.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Hutchison, T.W. (1960). The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory. New York: Kelley.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Reconstructing the Quantity Theory (I). SSRN Working Paper Series, 1895268: 1–28. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014). Economics for Economists. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2517242: 1–29. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015). Essentials of Constructive Heterodoxy: Money, Credit, Interest. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2569663: 1–19. URL

#1 Source Koning blog
#2 Graphic AXEC86
#3 Graphic AXEC87
#4 Keynesianism as ultimate profit machine

Related 'Demystifying employment theory and policy' and 'Cranks? What cranks? That’s economics!' and 'Helicopter money — a free lunch for the one-percenters' and 'Deficit spending, helicopter money, and profit' and 'Money, cranks, and morons' and 'Collateral damage'.

September 11, 2016

The end of traditional Heterodoxy in the Malmö coal pit

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘The Bourbaki-Debreu delusion of axiomatic economics’

Blog-Reference

“... but when the road ends at a coal-pit, he [the traveler] doesn’t need much judgment to know that he has gone wrong, and perhaps to find out what has led him astray.” (Hume)

It is known for a long time now that Orthodoxy is a degenerate research program. The problem is (i) that Heterodoxy spotted a myriad of faults and flaws but never the crucial foundational defect, and (ii), that Heterodoxy never inaugurated an independent and self-reliant PROGRESSIVE research program.

So traditional Heterodoxy followed as the at-all-times critical sidekick faithfully behind the orthodox Rocinante towards the end of the coal pit. To the quite natural question of what has gone wrong, the Malmö branch of traditional Heterodoxy answers that axiomatics had been the original sin of economics: “Mathematical axiomatic systems lead to analytic truths, which do not require empirical verification, since they are true by virtue of definitions and logic. It is a startling discovery of the twentieth century that sufficiently complex axiomatic systems are undecidable and incomplete.” (Asad Zaman)

This is as far beside the point as one can get because every methodologist knows that: “Formal axiomatic systems must be interpreted in some domain ... to become an empirical science.” (Boylan et al., 1995, p. 198)

And: “... a theory should be accurate within its domain, that is, consequences deducible from a theory should be in demonstrated agreement with the results of existing experiments and observations.” (Kuhn, quoted in Redman, 1993, p. 3)

Exactly at this critical juncture Debreu’s foundational error/mistake is located, viz. the complete DISCONNECT from the economic domain: “Allegiance to rigor dictates the axiomatic form of the analysis where the theory, in the strict sense, is logically entirely disconnected from its interpretations.” (1959, p. x)

Debreu’s application of axiomatics lacks a deeper understanding of the scientific method. There is some irony/absurdity in the fact that the great heterodox economist Georgescu-Roegen had been quite clear about the relationship between axioms and reality: “What particular reality is described by a given theory can be ascertained only from that theory’s axiomatic foundation.” (1966, p. 361)

Debreu missed the crucial point of Bourbaki’s axiomatics. “From the axiomatic point of view, mathematics appears thus as a storehouse of abstract forms — the mathematical structures; and it so happens — without our knowing why — that certain aspects of empirical reality fit themselves into these forms, as if through a kind of preadaptation. ... It is only in this sense of the word ‘form’ that one can call the axiomatic method a ‘formalism’.” (Bourbaki, 2005, p. 1276)

It was quite clear to Bourbaki that NOT ALL mathematical structures incorporate ‘… certain aspect of empirical reality’, which means, that there is a “... whole crop of monster-structures, entirely without application” (Bourbaki, 2005, p. 1275, fn. 9).

Hence, Debreu’s axiomatization of Walrasian General Equilibrium is a monster structure that is due to Debreu’s misunderstanding of Bourbaki. It is NOT the axiomatic-deductive method that is wrong, it is the neo-Walrasian axioms that are false.#1

“My opinion continues to be that axiomatics, like every other tool of science, is no better than its user, and not all users are skilled.” (Clower, 1995, p. 308)

‘Unskilled’ needs here be taken as a euphemism for utter scientific incompetence. It is this incompetence that brought Orthodoxy and its sidekick traditional Heterodoxy to the end of the coal pit.

Let us leave them there in their hopeless darkness.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Bourbaki, N. (2005). The Architecture of Mathematics. In W. Ewald (Ed.), From Kant to Hilbert. A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics, Volume II, 1265–1276. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press. (1948).
Boylan, T. A., and O’Gorman, P. F. (1995). Beyond Rhetoric and Realism in Economics. Towards a Reformulation of Economic Methodology. London: Routledge.
Clower, R. W. (1995). Axiomatics in Economics. Southern Economic Journal, 62(2): 307–319. URL
Debreu, G. (1959). Theory of Value. An Axiomatic Analysis of Economic Equilibrium. New Haven, London: Yale University Press.
Georgescu-Roegen, N. (1966). Analytical Economics, chapter Economic Theory and Agrarian Economics, 359–397. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Redman, D. A. (1993). Economics and the Philosophy of Science. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

#1 The whole theoretical superstructure of Orthodoxy is based upon this forever unacceptable set of hardcore propositions a.k.a. axioms:
HC1 There exist economic agents.
HC2 Agents have preferences over outcomes.
HC3 Agents independently optimize subject to constraints.
HC4 Choices are made in interrelated markets.
HC5 Agents have full relevant knowledge.
HC6. Observable economic outcomes are coordinated, so they must be discussed
with reference to equilibrium states. (Weintraub, 1985)

The mission of constructive Heterodoxy is to fully REPLACE this set with a superior set, i.e. to perform the Paradigm Shift.

Related 'From Orthodoxy to Heterodoxy to Metadoxy' and 'Economists and the economy ― a nonstarter since 200 years' and 'How incompetent are economic methodologists? Very!' and 'Macroeconomics: Economists are too stupid for science' and 'The canonical macroeconomic model'.

September 9, 2016

Economists: No legitimacy whatever

Comment on David Ruccio on ‘Capitalism vs. Democracy’

Blog-Reference

David Ruccio resumes: “I have been arguing for some time on this blog that contemporary capitalism faces a profound legitimation crisis.”

There is a problem here because, as an economist, David Ruccio has NO legitimacy to speak on political matters. Economists do not understand this because there have always been political economics and theoretical economics. The founding fathers were straightforward people and called themselves political economists; that is, they left no doubt that their main business was agenda pushing.

It was already clear to the economist and methodologist J. S. Mill, however, that it is fraudulent to use theoretical economics, which is committed to the well-defined scientific standards of true/false, as a fig leaf for political agenda pushing: “A scientific observer or reasoner, merely as such, is not an adviser for practice. His part is only to show that certain consequences follow from certain causes, and that to obtain certain ends, certain means are the most effectual. Whether the ends themselves are such as ought to be pursued, and if so, in what cases and to how great a length, it is no part of his business as a cultivator of science to decide, and science alone will never qualify him for the decision.” (Mill, 2006, p. 950)

Political economists, who are rather stupid folks, never understood Mill’s straightforward application of scientific ethics to economics. A good example is Hayek, who even volunteered as a useful idiot for Thatcher, who was in need of a scientific legitimation for her union-crushing agenda.

Political economics produced nothing of scientific value in the last 200 years. This is blatantly at odds with the claim that economics is a science, which in turn is as old as Adam Smith/Karl Marx. Economists always placed great emphasis on scientific legitimacy.

But things are, in fact, far worse. Not only do economists in their capacity as scientists have no legitimacy to speak on political matters, but as it turns out, they do not even have sufficient professional competence.

It is a provable fact that neither Walrasians, Keynesians, Marxians, nor Austrians have any clue about what profit is (2014). Now, an economist who does not understand the pivotal phenomenon of his subject matter cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, understand how the actual economy works.

“In order to tell the politicians and practitioners something about causes and best means, the economist needs the true theory or else he has not much more to offer than educated common sense or his personal opinion.” (Stigum, 1991, p. 30)

Lacking the true theory, the representative economist does not even have the professional legitimacy to give economic policy advice. Economists are like quacks who do not know how the human body works.

When non-economists hear an economist speaking about capitalism and democracy, they should immediately recall what political economics is all about: It isn’t science, it isn’t true, it is just another astounding piece of garbage from Econ 101.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014). The Profit Theory is False Since Adam Smith. What About the True Distribution Theory? SSRN Working Paper Series, 2511741: 1–23. URL
Mill, J. S. (2006). A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, Vol. 8 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Stigum, B. P. (1991). Toward a Formal Science of Economics: The Axiomatic Method in Economics and Econometrics. Cambridge: MIT Press.

Related 'Legitimacy lost' and 'Economics’ lack of scientific legitimacy' and 'MMT and the overall political corruption of economics' and 'Economists cannot do the simple math of profit — better keep them out of politics' and 'Schizonomics' and 'There is NO such thing as an economic expert' and 'Why does Heterodoxy not abolish the fake Nobel?' and 'Profit and the collective failure of economists' and 'The end of political economics (II)'

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COMMENT on robert locke, Ken Zimmerman, Vladimir A. Masch, gracchibros et.al.

After you have answered all open questions about WW2, it seems that you are in a position to crack some tough nuts
― Did Mr. Oswald assassinate Mr. Kennedy?
― Did Jesus really exist?
― Should we save mankind? Why? How?

Since this is an economics blog, it would also be fine to solve the perennial profit conundrum (Tómasson et al., 2010) ― but only if you can spare a few minutes from saving the world.


References
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL

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