October 24, 2015

Interest and profit

Comment on David Glasner on ‘Keynes on the Theory of Interest’

Blog-Reference

In the immediately preceding thread, Keynes and Accounting Identities, the rigorous formal proof has been given that Keynes’ elementary accounting identities are false. #1 From this follows, first of all, for economic policy that the familiar multiplier is formally defective. The correct employment multiplier is displayed under the label AXEC48 (2015a, eq. (15)).


The elementary Keynesian multiplier follows from the saving-equals-investment condition and the consumption function. Because I=S is provably false #2, it follows that the complementary story of the interest rate mechanism is false by logical implication. Because of this, a complete analytical reset is needed.

For good methodological reasons, one has to start — not from individual behavior but — from the institutional fact that an elementary production-consumption economy (no investment, no government, no foreign trade) consists of the banking sector, represented for a start by the central bank, and the production sector, represented for a start by a single firm. Now, there are two rates of interest — for overdrafts and deposits to begin with — and the difference between the two is a co-determinant of profit of the central bank, which produces, as the saying goes, money (= deposits) and credit (= overdrafts) out of nothing.

So, the interest rates on both sides of the central bank’s balance sheet and profit are closely intertwined. By consequence, if the profit theory is false, the interest theory is false by logical implication. Now, it has been shown that Keynes’ profit theory is definitely false. Because of this, his theory of interest is unacceptable. An alternative is needed.

To make a long argument short: the relation of the rate of interest to product price, the so-called real interest rate, has to be derived for the most elementary case from the production conditions of the sub-sectors of the elementary monetary economy (2013, eq. (28)), see also (2011, eq. (30)) and (2011) and (2015b, Sec. 7).

Roughly speaking, in the most elementary case, the real rate of interest is objectively determined by the respective productivities in the consumption good sector and the banking sector. Needless to stress that things become a bit more complex as soon as different term structures on the asset and liability side and the financing of investment expenditures are taken into the picture.

As Keynes realized, there is no direct connection between saving/dissaving and “the” rate of interest. Roughly speaking, the households can accumulate their period savings on a zero-interest deposit account as long as they wish, no matter what the actual rate for overdrafts/loans is. Hence, the intertemporal allocation of consumption expenditures (= period saving/dissaving) is — as a matter of principle — independent from the rate of interest. Because of this, Fisher’s subjective time preference approach cannot explain anything. Therefore, Keynes was right to ignore it.

It should be noted in passing that the stock of deposits/overdrafts is, in the most elementary case, the numerical integral of period saving/dissaving of the household sector. The two interest rates refer to the respective stocks and not to period saving/dissaving. The quantity of money is endogenously determined.

Takeaway: If profit theory is false, interest theory is false; this is the case with both Keynes’ and Fisher’s approach; I=S is always false and therefore cannot explain interest.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011a). The Emergence of Profit and Interest in the Monetary Circuit. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1973952: 1–22. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011b). Reconstructing the Quantity Theory (I). SSRN Working Paper Series, 1895268: 1–28. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Settling the Theory of Saving. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2220651: 1–23. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015a). Essentials of Constructive Heterodoxy: Employment. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2576867: 1–11. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2015b). Major Defects of the Market Economy. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2624350: 1–40. URL

#1 Refers to End of confusion and Keynes and the logical brilliance of Bedlam.
#2 The axiomatically correct relationship is given with Graphic AXEC09

October 22, 2015

Not yet in and not yet out of the wood

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Phelps’ smackdown on Lucas’ rational expectations’

Blog-Reference

(i) “In their mind, the scientific way is to suppose price and wage setters form their expectations with every bit as much understanding of markets as the expert economist seeking to model, or predict, their behavior.” (See intro)
(ii) Expert economists have no scientific understanding of how the market economy works.
(iii) Well-informed and rational agents do not take orthodox economics seriously. Ergo: the rational expectations approach is self-contradictory.

It is crystal clear by now that Orthodoxy badly missed ‘the scientific way’ or, as Schumpeter already realized “We are not yet out of the wood; in fact, we are not yet in it.” (1994, p. 7)

Unfortunately, Heterodoxy, too, is not out of the wood because it wastes too much time with debunking silly behavioral assumptions instead of putting economics on methodologically sound foundations and thereby leading it out of the proto-scientific wood of Lucas, Frydman, Phelps and all the quacking rest.

The scientific way has been shown by Joan Robinson: ‘Scrap the lot and start again.’*

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Schumpeter, J. A. (1994). History of Economic Analysis. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

* For the new curriculum see cross-references New curriculum

End of confusion (I)

Comment on David Glasner on ‘Keynes and Accounting Identities’

Blog-Reference

Hicks was the first to come up with a smart solution to the saving-investment conundrum: “What a tricky business this all is! In his Treatise on Money, Mr. Keynes told the world that savings and investment are only equal in conditions of equilibrium; that an excess of investment over saving means rising prices, and vice versa. In his General Theory, he told us that saving and investment are always equal, and that this is a mere identity or truism, without significance for the determination of prices. As far as I can make out, there are relevant and important senses in which all these statements are each of them right and each of them wrong.” (1939, p. 184)

Indeed, in economics, anything goes and at the end of every grand debate, the confusion is roughly the same as at the beginning; “Throughout the 1920s and 1930s the focus was increasingly on the role of the equality of saving and investment, but the semantic squabbles that dominated much of the debate (the distinctions between ‘ex-ante,’ and ‘ex-post,’ ‘planned’ and ‘realized’ saving and investment, the discussion of whether the equality of saving and investment was an identity or an equilibrium condition) reflected a deeper confusion.” (Blanchard, 2000, p. 1378)

The saving-equals-investment debate from Adam Smith onwards is a striking example of hereditary scientific incompetence.

Lest younger economists waste another eighty+ years in deeper confusion, it should be mentioned that the whole issue has been settled: “Autrement dit l’investissement n’est pas égal à l’épargne spontanée, mais à l’épargne spontanée augmenté du revenue non distribué des entreprises ....” (Allais, 1993, p. 69) Or, summed up in a crisp formula (Graphic AXEC09c, for details see 2014; 2013)


This formally consistent accounting identity makes it clear that saving and investment never were and never will be equal and that the familiar story of the interest rate mechanism has never been more than clueless verbiage.

The formal foundations of Keynesianism are defective. For Keynesians, though, inconsistency is not a fatal flaw but the sign of an extraordinary mind: “It is well known that John Maynard was born anew every morning; for this reason, his colleagues at Bretton Woods commented that he was too intelligent to be consistent.” (Valentino, 1988, p. 239)

Any questions why Keynesians messed the whole IS thing up and, more generally, why economics is a failed science?

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Allais, M. (1993). Les Fondements Comptables de la Macro-Économie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd edition.
Blanchard, O. (2000). What Do We Know about Macroeconomics that Fisher and Wicksell Did Not? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(4): 1375–1409. URL
Hicks, J. R. (1939). Value and Capital. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edition.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Settling the Theory of Saving. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2220651: 1–23. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014). The Three Fatal Mistakes of Yesterday Economics: Profit, I=S, Employment. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2489792: 1–13. URL
Valentino, R. (1988). Discussion. In H. Hanusch (Ed.), Evolutionary Economics. Applications of Schumpeter’s Ideas, 238–249. Cambridge, New York, etc.: Cambridge University Press.

Related 'Keynes and the logical brilliance of Bedlam'

For details of the big picture, see cross-references I=S


***
ICYMI (comment on Anders of Oct 22)

The premise income=expenditure is false, as I pointed out above (Oct 21), and the deeper reason is that the profit theory is false. For the rectification of Keynes's approach, see the working paper The Three Fatal Mistakes of Yesterday Economics: Profit, I=S, Employment.


***
ICYMI (comment on Ramanan of Oct 22)

The mistake in your argument is that at first household saving is denoted with S and then, in an additional step, the sum of household saving and “Firm's saving” is also denoted with S. With this inadmissible double notation, one arrives indeed at the familiar result. I have clarified this case in Section 17 of the working paper Keynes’s Missing Axioms.


***
ICYMI (comment on Anders of Oct 23)

Indeed, you ask the pivotal question: “I’m still unclear how you repudiate the basic “income=expenditure” identity. Within an accounting period, if aggregate income isn’t equal to expenditure, where does the surplus (deficit) go (come from)?”

The shortest possible and graphics-supported answer has been given in the 3-page working paper Debunking Squared.

The complete answer with the consistent inclusion of money has been derived in The Emergence of Profit and Interest in the Monetary Circuit.

In sum: Neither Classicals, nor Walrasians, nor Marshallians, nor Marxians, nor Keynesians, nor Institutionalists, nor Monetary Economists, nor MMTers, nor Austrians, nor Sraffaians, nor Evolutionists, nor Game theorists, nor EconoPhysicists, nor RBCers, nor New Keynesians, nor New Classicals ever came to grips with profit. Hence, they fail to capture the essence of the market economy.

***

ICYMI  (comment on Anders of Oct 23 on Oct 24)

The formally correct accounting relationship is given in Graph AXEC09.






Ignore for simplicity, distributed/retained profit, i.e., Yd=0. Then the equation says: monetary profit Qm is equal to the difference between investment I and monetary saving Sm. All variables are measurable with a precision of two decimals, and one will always find that the business sector’s investment expenditures are different from the household sector’s saving/dissaving in a period of a given length, and that profit/loss for the business sector as a whole is different from zero.

Again, all I=S models are false, and the proof is in the national accounts, see The Common Error of Common Sense: An Essential Rectification of the Accounting Approach.

Your statement ‘profit does not constitute a problem for standard economics’ is a bit strange, to say the least. The profit theory is false since Adam Smith, and this methodological blunder disqualifies the whole of economics. The fact of the matter is that the representative economist cannot, after more than 200 years, tell the difference between profit and income. You will not find many examples in the history of science that are more embarrassing.

***

ICYMI (comment on djb of Oct 23 and Anders of Oct 23 on Oct 25)

You say: “Keynes understood profit was included in total income.”

This is true, of course, but my argument is that exactly at this point Keynes made the fatal conceptual blunder, which consists of not coming to grips with the two fundamental economic concepts profit and income. To miss the crucial difference is just as unpardonable as a physicist confounding force and energy.

I perfectly agree with Anders up to this point: “Now, let’s make one business start to run a profit. This can happen from another agent running a deficit ...” This is a good example of begging the question. It is not demonstrated in detail how profit emerges from the monetary circuit, but simply assumed with “let’s make one business start to run a profit ...” Note well, if one business starts to make a profit and the other makes a complementary loss, the profit of the business sector as a whole is still zero, just as in the initial case. Obviously, this does not explain how the business sector has managed to make overall positive profits over several centuries.

Here is again the formally correct accounting relationship (Graphic AXEC09b):


For simplicity, distributed profit and investment are set to zero, i.e., Yd=0 and I=0. Then the equation says for the pure consumption economy: monetary profit for the business sector as a whole Qm is equal to dissaving; and monetary loss is equal to monetary saving Sm (under the condition of product-market-clearing, that is, no inventory investment/disinvestment).

Profit is a phenomenon that can only emerge in a monetary economy. As a matter of principle, real models cannot explain profit.

Summary: It is incorrect to say that total income is the sum of wage income and profit, but it is correct to say that total income is the sum of wage income and distributed profit. This is the all-dominant conceptual difference. Its oversight makes that economic theory from Adam Smith to Keynes and up to the present will not even make a footnote in the history of scientific thought.

***

ICYMI (comment on djb of Oct 25 on Oct 26)

Confusion is the default state of the representative economist (2013). Obviously, you cannot get out of Keynes’s accounting mess by nonstop introducing new concepts like wealth, capital, the consumption function, etc. The solution lies exactly in the opposite direction.

“There can be no doubt whatsoever that a problem which has not yet been solved in all its aspects under its simplest conditions will be still more difficult to tackle if other, ‘more realistic’ assumptions are being made.” (Morgenstern, 1941, p. 373)

In the most elementary case of the consumption economy, the accounting identity says (i) Qm≡−Sm.

After taking investment into account, the accounting identity reads (ii) Qm≡I−Sm (for the full investment cycle, see 2011).

And so it goes consistently on to ever-higher levels of complexity. Equations (i) and (ii) tell you that saving is never equal to investment. All equations are testable/refutable in principle. So there is absolutely no need for endless confused blather.


References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Squaring the Investment Cycle. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1911796: 1–25. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Confused Confusers: How to Stop Thinking Like an Economist and Start Thinking Like a Scientist. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2207598: 1–16. URL
Morgenstern, O. (1941). Professor Hicks on Value and Capital. Journal of Political Economy, 49(3): 361–393. URL

October 21, 2015

Keynes and the logical brilliance of Bedlam

Comment on David Glasner on ‘Keynes and Accounting Identities’

Blog-Reference

It is the very definition of a non-scientist to transform every objective problem into an ad-hominem story and thereby to make it definitively insoluble. This works because most people are fond of stories, which allow for good/bad moralizing or like/dislike blather, but not so much of scientifically valid theories, which allow only for clear-cut true/false judgments.

Accordingly, David Glasner frames the issue of accounting identities thus: “Keynes, who besides being one of the most intelligent people of the 20th century was also so ferociously logical (and these two qualities do not necessarily overlap) that he was almost certainly incapable of making a logical mistake or of forgetting accounting identities.” (See intro)

This distraction works because now we are entangled in the question of whether Keynes or his opponent, Hawtrey, was more intelligent/brilliant. To be sure, the correct answer had been given long ago by Nobel laureate Allais, but because it had been delivered in French, it never came to the attention of the representative economist: “L’intuition de Keynes lui a fait sentir où se trouvaient les difficultés, mais son insuffisance logique ne lui a pas permis de résoudre les problèmes que son intuition lui avait fait entrevoir.” (1993, p. 70) Roughly: Keynes's intuition led him to the real difficulties, but his logical insufficiency prevented the solution.

This is a polite way of saying that logical consistency was not exactly one of Keynes's strong points. But, in the final analysis, this does not matter much because Keynes was first and foremost a political economist and not a scientist. In politics, the effectiveness of an argument counts and, as a rule, the intended audience couldn't care less about logical and material consistency.

In sum, Hahn’s characterization is more to the point: “I consider that Keynes had no real grasp of formal economic theorizing (and also disliked it), and that he consequently left many gaping holes in his theory. I nonetheless hold that his insights were several orders more profound and realistic than those of his recent critics.” (1982, pp. x-xi)

To characterize Keynes as ‘ferociously logical’ is plainly against what Keynes himself thought about the whole issue “... a remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam.” (quoted in Moggridge, 1976, p. 36)

The final proof of Keynes's logical incapacity is that he messed up the most elementary accounting identities. As a centerpiece of the General Theory, he formulated the foundational syllogism of macroeconomics. “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)

This elementary two-liner is conceptually and logically defective because Keynes did not come to grips with profit (Tómasson et al., 2010, pp. 12-13, 16). The fault is in the premise ‘income = value of output’. This equality holds initially only in the limiting case of zero profit in both the consumption and investment goods industries. Hence, Keynes formally dealt with a zero-profit economy without being aware of it (2011a; 2011b). This means in concrete terms that the multiplier formula is provably false.

The first logical blunder kicked off a chain reaction of mistakes because when profit is not correctly defined, income is not correctly defined, and then saving is not correctly defined. As a consequence, all I=S models are logically defective. Krugman, for one, has not gotten the point to this day and underpins his economic policy advice with a recent variant of IS-LM (2014). This does not matter either, because Krugman, too, is merely a political economist and not a scientist.

The root cause of all accounting errors/mistakes is a complete lack of understanding of what profit is. The conceptual error carries over to national accounting (2012).

Walras’s original model had also been a zero-profit economy. Clearly, Walrasianism and Keynesianism are squarely at odds with reality. Yet, economists are busily occupied with shop talk about the Bedlam models of their brilliant masterminds to this very day.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Allais, M. (1993). Les Fondements Comptables de la Macro-Économie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd edition.
Hahn, F. H. (1982). Money and Inflation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011a). Keynes’s Missing Axioms. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1841408: 1–33. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011b). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). The Common Error of Common Sense: An Essential Rectification of the Accounting Approach. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2124415: 1–23. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014). Mr. Keynes, Prof. Krugman, IS-LM, and the End of Economics as We Know It. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2392856: 1–19. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Moggridge, D. E. (1976). Keynes. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Tómasson, G., and Bezemer, D. J. (2010). What is the Source of Profit and Interest? A Classical Conundrum Reconsidered. MPRA Paper, 20557: 1–34. URL


***

Graphic AXEC225a Economists' Starter Kit with correct accounting identities/balances

October 19, 2015

Misled by ordinary intuition and common sense

Comment on Edward Fullbrook on ‘The Counterintuitive Problem’

Blog-Reference

The decisive strength of Aristotle’s physics had been that it was intuitively convincing and, lo and behold, not too much has changed since the old days: “[The] stunning finding was that 87 percent of the students who had had no training in physics gave answers considered incorrect according to modern physics, but consonant with Aristotelian notions of motion and impetus. A further result, which gave even greater pause, was that 27 percent of those who had studied physics gave Aristotelian answers.” (Mirowski, 1995, p. 104)

So much for the power of intuition and common sense which have turned out in the meantime to be the most persistent impediment to scientific advancement “... that the new physics of the seventeenth century, which replaced the older concepts of motion, rest, and change, involved a radical reorientation of the view of the cosmos and the possibilities of an infinite void space, thus yielding an almost entirely new philosophy of nature and a wholly different physics that contradicted ordinary intuition and common sense.” (Cohen, 1977, p. 318-319)

In short, science begins exactly beyond ordinary intuition and common sense as already J. S. Mill told his fellow economists: “People fancied they saw the sun rise and set, the stars revolve in circles round the pole. We now know that they saw no such thing; what they really saw was a set of appearances, equally reconcilable with the theory they held and with a totally different one. It seems strange that such an instance as this, ..., should not have opened the eyes of the bigots of common sense, and inspired them with a more modest distrust of the competency of mere ignorance to judge the conclusions of cultivated thought.” (2006, p. 783)

This crucial insight was lost on the Cambridge School, first on Marshall “Economics for Marshall was the perfection of common sense.” (Hoover, 1998, p. 243), then on Keynes “L’intuition de Keynes lui a fait sentir où se trouvaient les difficultés, mais son insuffisance logique ne lui a pas permis de résoudre les problèmes que son intuition lui avait fait entrevoir.” (Allais, 1993, p. 70) [Keynes intuition led him to the real difficulties but his logical inability thwarted the solution (see also 2011)]. As Moggridge confirmed, “For, if anything, Keynes was the most intuitive of men.” (1976, p. 33)

To reject Keynes’s ordinary intuition is not to reject scientific intuition “... we cannot over-emphasize the fundamental role played in this research by a special intuition, which is not the popular sense-intuition, but rather a kind of direct divination (ahead of all reasoning) ...” (Bourbaki, 2005, p. 1272)

The most misleading intuition is that economics is a science of behavior (2011). It should be clear by now that second-guessing human behavior, animal spirits or reflexive expectations cannot lead to much more than folk psychology, sociologism, storytelling or gossip.

The crucial methodological error/mistake can be traced back to Jevons: “The science of Economics, however, is in some degree peculiar, owing to the fact ... that its ultimate laws are known to us immediately by intuition, or, at any rate, they are furnished to us ready made by other mental or physical sciences.” (Jevons, 1911, p. 18)

This turned out to be the representative economist’s fatal illusion “It is possibly very encouraging for the economist to hear that compared with the natural scientist the psychological method saves him “ages of laborious research” but it is curious and a pity that this huge start has not enabled him to formulate any considerable body of reliable prognoses such as the natural sciences have managed to achieve.” (Hutchison, 1960, p. 132)

What the representative economist has not realized until this very day is that ordinary intuition and common sense are the very hallmarks of proto-science. All depends on taking the decisive methodological step: “Economics inevitably goes beyond common sense and intuition.” (Dow, 2006, p. 15)

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Allais, M. (1993). Les Fondements Comptable de la Macro-Économie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2nd edition.
Bourbaki, N. (2005). The Architecture of Mathematics. In W. Ewald (Ed.), From Kant to Hilbert. A Source Book in the Foundations of Mathematics, Volume II, pages 1265–1276. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
Cohen, I. B. (1977). History and the Philosopher of Science. In F. Suppe (Ed.), The Structure of Scientific Theories, pp. 308–349. Urbana, Chicago: University of Illinois Press.
Dow, S. C. (2006). Economic Methodology: An Inquiry. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hoover, K. D. (1998). Comment: Keynes, Marshall and Involuntary Unemployment. In R. E. Backhouse, D. M. Hausman, U. Mäki, and A. Salanti (Eds.), Economics and Methodology. Crossing Boundaries, pp. 236–247. Houndmills, Basingstoke, London: Palgrave.
Hudík, M. (2011). Why Economics is Not a Science of Behaviour. Journal of Economic Methodology, 18(2): 147–162.
Hutchison, T.W. (1960). The Significance and Basic Postulates of Economic Theory. New York: Kelley.
Jevons, W. S. (1911). The Theory of Political Economy. London, Bombay, etc.: Macmillan, 4th edition. URL https://www.econlib.org/library/YPDBooks/Jevons/jvnPE.html
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Mill, J. S. (2006). A System of Logic Ratiocinative and Inductive. Being a Connected View of the Principles of Evidence and the Methods of Scientific Investigation, volume 8 of Collected Works of John Stuart Mill. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
Mirowski, P. (1995). More Heat than Light. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Moggridge, D. E. (1976). Keynes. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

Related 'The Science-of-Man fallacy'.

Economics in self-paralysis

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Representative agent models — macroeconomic foundations made of sand’

Blog-Reference and the slightly extended variant Blog-Reference

You summarize: “... Hugo Sonnenschein, Rolf Mantel, and Gerard Debreu unequivocally showed that there did not exist any condition by which assumptions on individuals would guarantee neither stability nor uniqueness of the equilibrium solution.” (See intro)

Yes, indeed, since 1972 every competent economist can know this: General Equilibrium Theory is dead. So what? What exactly follows from this proof?

It follows nothing less than this: Orthodoxy is dead. Why? Because it has been defined thus: “It is a touchstone of accepted economics that all explanations must run in terms of the actions and reactions of individuals. Our behavior in judging economic research, in peer review of papers and research, and in promotions, includes the criterion that in principle the behavior we explain and the policies we propose are explicable in terms of individuals, not of other social categories.” (Arrow, 1994, p. 1)

There is not the slightest ambiguity: according to this self-definition of Orthodoxy, the representative agent approach is a priori out, inadmissible, a self-contradiction, a methodological absurdity.

What follows from this? Because the microfoundation program is a shot in the foot, it has no future. What, in turn, follows from this? “There is another alternative: to formulate a completely new research program and conceptual approach. As we have seen, this is often spoken of, but there is still no indication of what it might mean.” (Ingrao and Israel, 1990, p. 362)

So, what could it possibly mean? Hmmm? Which part of ‘a completely new research program’ is unclear?

It simply follows that it is a waste of time to defend or attack the microfoundation program because we know for sure that it was already dead when Jevons/Walras/ Menger started it.

It is not worth the time to criticize again and again different aspects of Orthodoxy because the program is as meaty as geocentrism in physics. Yet, what is even worse than ‘finicky scholasticism — getting tied up in little assertions or minor criticism (Popper)’ is to resort to the conclusion that Orthodoxy is proto-scientific garbage but that it is, given the complexity/ uncertainty of the subject matter, the best that could be achieved. This, unfortunately, seems to be the deadlock between Orthodoxy and traditional Heterodoxy: “Yet most economists neither seek alternative theories nor believe that they can be found.” (Hausman, 1992, p. 248)

This self-paralysis explains why economics is still at the proto-scientific level. There is no way around this; after the SMD proof, there remains only one worthwhile talking point, and that is: what does the new economics Paradigm look like? #1

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Arrow, K. J. (1994). Methodological Individualism and Social Knowledge. American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 84(2): 1–9. URL
Hausman, D. M. (1992). The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Ingrao, B., and Israel, G. (1990). The Invisible Hand. Economic Equilibrium in the History of Science. Cambridge, London: MIT Press.

#1 For details of the big picture, see cross-references Paradigm Shift

October 17, 2015

Crisis, cranks, and scientists

Comment on David Ruccio on ‘A gathering storm?’

Blog-Reference

The normal course of events is this: people look at the global/national economy or their regional/personal environment and see an acute or chronic defect (distribution of income/wealth/power/resources, unemployment, stagnation, exploitation, pollution/ depletion/extinction, asset bubbles, inflation/deflation, abuse/fraud/hype/deceit/ corruption, dysfunctional institutions, etc) and then come forward with the solution.

“A sure sign of a crisis is the prevalence of cranks. It is characteristic of a crisis in theory that cranks get a hearing from the public which orthodoxy is failing to satisfy. In the thirties we had Major Douglas, and social credit — it can all be done with a fountain pen — and Warren and Pearson who convinced President Roosevelt that raising the dollar price of gold would raise the price of everything else and bring the slump to an end. The cranks are to be preferred to the orthodox because they see that there is a problem. Nowadays we have plenty of cranks taking up the problems that the economists overlook.” (Robinson, 1972, p. 8)

This is certainly NOT what science is all about. Broadly speaking: economics, understood as the collective scientific knowledge of economists, can tell with a sufficiently high degree of certainty how the economy works, what the critical functions are, how institutions have to be designed to guarantee the proper functioning of subsystems and the integrated whole and thereby contribute to the prevention of major crises in the short and long run. Thus defined, there is NO economics.

Crises are the high time for political economists and the normal course of events is that suggestive quick fixes are applied. A grossly simplified example is to fight unemployment with prolonged deficit spending, which leads to growing debt, which at some point calls for helicopter money, which then can ‘be done with a fountain pen’.

There is little to say against deficit spending or helicopter money as a commonsensical quick fix in case of emergency except that it has no valid foundation in something resembling a valid economic theory. No economist is needed to figure out this kind of ‘solution’. In many cases, they are not even innovative, e.g.: “Public works to relieve the unemployed is an idea as old as the Bible; ...” (Blaug, 1998, p. 662). The same holds for debt jubilees.

When a Heterodox economist sees a meltdown coming three ideas immediately cross his mind (i) confirmation, i.e. Orthodoxy is indeed a failed approach, and (ii), regret, i.e. Heterodoxy has failed to come up in due time with the superior Paradigm, and (iii), to go with panic makers and cranks is not exactly what Heterodoxy is meant to be.

The grand task of Heterodoxy was and still is to figure out what an economy looks like that is free of major crises in a way that is scientifically more convincing than general equilibrium theory.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Blaug, M. (1998). Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition.
Robinson, J. (1972). The Second Crisis of Economic Theory. American Economic Review, 62(1/2): 1–10. URL.

Related 'Misplaced augurs of doom'.