March 25, 2013

Crisis and Methodology: Some Heterodox Misunderstandings {31b}



Abstract  Whether justified by the concrete circumstances or not, an economic crisis is, by simple association, taken as an implicit refutation of the invisible hand vision and the underlying theory. The fundamental heterodox critique locates the source of apparent theoretical difficulties at the level of methodology. Although acceptable in principle, this belief involves some actual misunderstandings with regard to the respective roles of deterministic laws and deductive reasoning. In order to clarify these, the present paper revisits some key episodes in the history of economic methodology.

March 15, 2013

Why Post Keynesianism is not yet a science {23b}


Abstract  In a programmatic article Alfred Eichner explained, from a Post Keynesian perspective, why neoclassical economics is not yet a science. This was some time ago and one would expect that Post Keynesianism, with a heightened awareness of scientific standards, has done much better than alternative approaches in the meantime. There is wide agreement that this is not the case. Explanations, though, differ widely. The present – strictly formal – inquiry identifies an elementary logical flaw. This strengthens the argument that the Post Keynesian motto ‘it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!’ is methodologically indefensible.

March 11, 2013

The calculating auctioneer, enlightened wage setters, and the fingers of the Invisible Hand {40}

Working paper at SSRN
Working paper at ARCHIVE

Abstract  The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epitomize the interdependence of real and nominal variables that constitutes the monetary economy. This is a cogent conclusion from the persistent collapse of behavioral and real models. Conceptual rigor demands, first, to take objective-structural axioms as a formal point of departure and, secondly, to clarify the interrelations of the fundamental concepts of income and profit. The present paper reconstructs the characteristic properties of a Walrasian economy in structural axiomatic terms, generalizes them, and explores the consequences for our understanding of the working of the economy we happen to live in.

February 23, 2013

Walras's Law of Markets as special case of the General Period Core Theorem {39}

Working paper at SSRN
Working paper at ARCHIVE

Abstract  From the set of the first three structural axioms follows the Period Core Theorem. It asserts that the product of the key ratios, which characterize the firm, the market outcome, and the income distribution, is always equal to unity. The theorem contains only unit-free variables, is testable in principle, and involves no behavioral assumptions. The differentiated Period Core Theorem applies to an arbitrary number of firms. Therefrom Walras's Law can be derived without recourse to demand and supply functions or the notion of equilibrium. It is shown that the familiar interpretation is methodologically illegitimate.

For the complete set of foundational equations — structural axioms and behavioral propensity function — see AXEC61.

February 22, 2013

Settling the theory of saving {38}

Working paper at SSRN
Working paper at ARCHIVE

Abstract  There is no way around it: each theory rests on a tiny set of foundational propositions. Standard economics rests on behavioral axioms. After a long intellectual detour, it should be clear by now that behavioral axioms are the wrong formal departure point. Being beyond repair, they have to be replaced by objective structural axioms. This paper deals with saving and its relation to investment and profit. It starts with the fact that there is no such thing as a 'real' economy. Hence economic phenomena are only explicable as the outcome of the interaction of real and nominal variables.

January 28, 2013

Confused confusers: how to stop thinking like an economist and start thinking like a scientist {37}

Working paper at SSRN
Working paper at ARCHIVE

Abstract  The present paper takes it as an indisputable fact that subjective-behavioral thinking leads, for deeper methodological reasons, to inconclusive filibustering about the agents' economic conduct and therefore has to be replaced by something fundamentally different. The key argument runs as follows: (a) the subjective-behavioral approach cannot, as a matter of principle, afford a correct profit theory, (b) without a correct profit theory it is impossible to comprehend how the monetary economy works, (c) without this knowledge economic policy proposals are unjustifiable, (d) thinking like an economist may be hazardous to the economy.

December 16, 2012

Primary and secondary markets {15b}

Working paper at ARCHIVE

Abstract  This paper swaps the standard behavioral axioms for structural axioms and applies the latter to the analysis of the emergence of secondary markets from the flow part of the economy. Real and nominal residuals at first give rise to the accumulation of the stock of money and the stock of commodities. These stocks constitute the demand and supply side of secondary markets. The pricing in these markets is different from the pricing in the primary markets. Realized appreciation in the secondary markets is different from income or profit. To treat primary and secondary markets alike is therefore a category mistake.