September 22, 2016

The identification problem and the dumping of the old guard

Comment on David Ruccio on ‘Phlogiston, the identification problem, and the state of macroeconomics’

Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Sep 23 adapted to context

There is political economics and theoretical economics. The founding fathers were straightforward people and called themselves political economists; that is, they left no doubt that their main business was agenda-pushing. Economists never got out of political economics. In other words, theoretical economics (= science) ultimately could not emancipate itself from political economics (= agenda-pushing). And this is how economics became one of the most embarrassing failures in the history of scientific thought.

Now, Paul Romer argues: “A parallel with string theory from physics hints at a general failure mode of science that is triggered when respect for highly regarded leaders evolves into a deference to authority that displaces objective fact from its position as the ultimate determinant of scientific truth.” (See intro)

The keyword is scientific truth. Why is scientific truth suddenly the uppermost value? Actually, it is not! Since the founding fathers, theoretical economics has been dominated by political economics. What Romer is communicating with his critique of DSGE/RBC/ mathiness is nothing less than a change of policy, which means that theoretical economics has now speedily adapted to a new agenda. To wrap the new task for the economics community in a critique of the identification problem, which is as old as Econometrica (1933), proves a strong sense of humor.

There is a policy change in the offing that requires a redecoration of the scientific fig leaf. The severe critique of the old authority (Lucas, Sargent, Prescot, et al.) makes it clear that there is a new authority and that the old loyalties are obsolete.

With regard to the scientific status of economics (= material and formal consistency), the situation is UNCHANGED for half an eternity. Methodologically, the maximization-and-equilibrium approach has always been axiomatically unacceptable, but economists swallowed it hook, line, and sinker from Jevons/Walras/Menger onward to DSGE. The microfoundations approach is not a degenerate research program but has already been dead in the cradle. #1

This is the current state of economics: Walrasian microfoundations are false for 150+ years, and the Keynesian macrofoundations are false for 80+ years. #2 As a consequence, all models that contain maximization-and-equilibrium or I=S/IS-LM are a priori false, and together this is roughly 90 percent of the content of peer-reviewed economic quality journals and 100 percent of textbooks.

Because they either do not fully realize that their research program has already been dead in the cradle or because they have not the slightest idea about what a progressive alternative could look like, the present generation of orthodox and heterodox economists has not made and cannot make a significant contribution to the discussion about how the actual economy works. #3 These folks are not part of the solution; they ARE the defunct research programs. #4

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


#1 No future for axiomatically false economics
#2 Marshall and the Cambridge school of plain economic gibberish
#3 The trouble with economics prizes
#4 For details of the big picture, see cross-references Paradigm Shift

Following Outside of science


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Graphic AXEC121i

Dead men tweeting

Comment on Brad DeLong on ‘DSGE as a Degenerating Research Program in Lakatosian Terms’

Blog-Reference

Krugman put it nicely: “... most of what I and many others do is sorta-kinda neoclassical because it takes the maximization-and-equilibrium world as a starting point.”

Methodologically, the maximization-and-equilibrium approach is axiomatically unacceptable but economists swallowed it hook, line and sinker from Jevons/Walras/Menger onward to DSGE. The microfoundations approach is not degenerating but has already been dead in the cradle.#1

This is the current state of economics: Walrasian microfoundations are false for 150+ years and the Keynesian macrofoundations are false for 80+ years.#2 As a consequence, all models that contain maximization-and-equilibrium or I=S/IS-LM are a priori false and together this is roughly 90 percent of the content of peer-reviewed economic quality journals and 100 percent of textbooks.

Brad DeLong and his friends are active participants in one of the most embarrassing failures in the history of scientific thought.

Because they either do not fully realize that their research program has already been dead in the cradle or because they have not the slightest idea about what a progressive alternative could look like, the present generation of economists has not made and cannot make a significant contribution to the discussion about how the actual economy works.

These folks are not part of the solution they ARE the defunct research program.#3

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


#1 No future for axiomatically false economics
#2 Marshall and the Cambridge school of plain economic gibberish
#3 The trouble with economics prizes

September 20, 2016

Scientists and science actors

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Chicago drivel — a sure way to get a ‘Nobel prize’ in economics’

Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference

Personal experience makes only a tiny part of what every human knows about the world/ universe and other humans, the greater part stems from myth/religion/philosophy/ science. Myth/religion/philosophy is storytelling and does not satisfy the scientific criteria of logical and empirical consistency. Storytelling is easy, to establish consistency is hard. From the history of the last 5000 years, we know that stories sell well, the absurder the better. The average person prefers belief/opinion (= doxa) to knowledge (= episteme) and thinks more about natural/supernatural persons/personifications and less about the universe and its sub-systems. Because of this, nearly 100 percent of human communication consists of gossip.

A case in point is economics. What Thomas Sargent tells his students boils down to: (i) humans respond to incentives, (ii) one cannot always get what one wants, (iii) in equilibrium economic agents are satisfied, (iv) sometimes people/governments keep their promises, sometimes not, (v) people try to get more out of the social pot than they put in, (vi) it is difficult/impossible to know other peoples’ motives/preferences and to forecast their actions. (See intro)

This is folk psychology and folk sociology — PsySoc for short. The economist Sargent tells his students how humans work but not how the economy works. The main reason is that Sargent and his fellow economists at Chicago, Berkeley, Harvard, and elsewhere do not know how the economy works.

This would not be a big issue, after all, people talk most of the time about NONENTITIES and things they know nothing about. To believe in standard economics is in no way different from the belief in the myths of ancient goat herders. The real trouble with economics begins here: “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel”.

The keyword is science[s]. Why not simply “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economics”? The original title clearly communicates the claim that economics is a science. This claim is as old as Adam Smith/Karl Marx. But economists never lived up to the claim.

Science is well-defined by the criteria of formal and material consistency: “Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994)

Neither orthodox nor heterodox economics satisfies the criteria of formal and material consistency. Worse, economists violate scientific standards since the founding fathers. There is no exception: Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, or Austrian economics is provably inconsistent.

There are political economics and theoretical economics. The founding fathers were straightforward people and called themselves political economists, that is, they left no doubt that their main business was agenda pushing. Economists never got out of political economics. In other words, theoretical economics (= science) ultimately could not emancipate itself from political economics (= agenda-pushing). And this is how economics became one of the most embarrassing failures in the history of scientific thought.

Economics is not a science, but what Feynman famously called a cargo cult science. Accordingly, economists are not scientists but science actors. The difference is this: “A genuine inquirer aims to find out the truth of some question, whatever the color of that truth. ... A pseudo-inquirer seeks to make a case for the truth of some proposition(s) determined in advance. There are two kinds of pseudo-inquirer, the sham and the fake. A sham reasoner is concerned, not to find out how things really are, but to make a case for some immovably-held preconceived conviction. A fake reasoner is concerned, not to find out how things really are, but to advance himself by making a case for some proposition to the truth-value of which he is indifferent.” (Haack, 1997, p. 1)

Not only the Chicago version but economics in all its orthodox and heterodox variants is unacceptable proto-scientific garbage. The first thing to do is to rename the most prestigious economics prize into “Bank of Sweden Oscar for the best science actor/actress.”

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Haack, S. (1997). Science, Scientism, and Anti-Science in the Age of Preposterism. Skeptical Inquirer, 21(6): 1–7. URL

Related 'Feeble minds, shaky assumptions, and the inevitable failure of economics' and 'How to get out of the Econ 101 PsySoc woods' and 'Economics is NOT a science of behavior' and 'From PsySoc to SysHum' and 'The happy end of the social science delusion' and 'The Science-of-Man fallacy' and 'PsySoc — the scourge of economics' and 'A farewell to PsySoc economics'.

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REPLY to Peter on Sep 21

Your argument adds nothing to the discussion but distracts from the main point. The question is: Is the theory/model true or false. The character of the author, his CV, and what his motives might be is ultimately irrelevant. Science is about proof and not about personality or credibility.

“Remember: occasionally, it may be an interesting question to ask why a man says what he says; but whatever the answer, it does not tell us anything about whether what he says is true or false.” (Schumpeter)#1

Chicago economics is provably false. The same holds for Cambridge economics. It is irrelevant whether Cambridge is regarded as politically more leftist and Chicago more rightist. The point is that both Chicago and Cambridge produce proto-scientific garbage.


#1 See also the first 60 seconds of Feynman on Scientific Method on YouTube

No future for axiomatically false economics

Comment on Narayana Kocherlakota on ‘How to Build a Better Macroeconomics’

Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Sep 22 adapted to context

There are political economics and theoretical economics. The founding fathers were straightforward people and called themselves political economists; that is, they left no doubt that their main business was agenda pushing. Economists never got out of political economics. In other words, theoretical economics (= science) ultimately could not emancipate itself from political economics (= agenda-pushing). This is how economics became one of the most embarrassing failures in the history of scientific thought.

Standard economics is built upon this hardcore set of foundational propositions/axioms: “HC1 economic agents have preferences over outcomes; HC2 agents individually optimize subject to constraints; HC3 agent choice is manifest in interrelated markets; HC4 agents have full relevant knowledge; HC5 observable outcomes are coordinated, and must be discussed with reference to  equilibrium states.” (Weintraub, 1985)

Methodologically, this axiom set is forever unacceptable, but economists swallowed it hook, line, and sinker from Jevons/Walras/Menger onward to DSGE. The failure of methodological individualism is indisputable. The ultimate reason can be stated as an impossibility theorem: NO way leads from the explanation of individual behavior to the explanation of how the economic system works. In other words, the microfoundations approach has already been dead in the cradle.

Keynes started the macrofoundations research program in the General Theory formally as follows: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (p. 63) These formal foundations are conceptually and logically defective because Keynes never came to grips with profit and therefore “discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010)

Keynes’s original blunder kicked off a chain reaction of errors/mistakes. As a result, all I=S/IS-LM models are worthless. Most importantly, Keynes’s profit conundrum remained unsolved. To this day, neither Walrasians, nor Keynesians, nor Marxians, nor Austrians have gotten profit right. As the Palgrave Dictionary puts it: “A satisfactory theory of profits is still elusive” (Desai). Because economists have NO IDEA of the pivotal concept of their subject matter, they cannot explain how the actual economy works, which means that their policy guidance has NO sound scientific foundation.

This is the current state of economics: Walrasian microfoundations are false for 150+ years, and the Keynesian macrofoundations are false for 80+ years. As a consequence, all models that contain maximization-and-equilibrium or I=S/IS-LM are a priori false, and together this is roughly 90 percent of the content of peer-reviewed economic quality journals and 100 percent of textbooks. Robert Lucas has been a major participant in this scientific disaster. To expect good advice for the future of macroeconomics from an economist who has proven his scientific incompetence over the last three decades is beyond ridiculous.

To get out of failed economics requires a Paradigm Shift from Walrasian microfoundations and Keynes’ flawed macrofoundations to entirely new macrofoundations. In methodological terms, to build better macroeconomics requires the replacement of the false axioms of Lucas et al. with true axioms and the dishonorable discharge of the DSGE crowd from science.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke

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REPLY to reason on Sep 21

You say: “I understand the potential importance of profit as a driver of investment (i.e., it is important from the point of view of motivation and micro-foundations), but I don’t see the relevance to macro flow analysis.”

This is because you are way behind the curve and still cling to the fundamental error that economics is a behavioral science (Hudík, 2011).#1 Profit, though, does not appear because agents need an incentive. Profit for the economy as a whole appears or fails to appear, independently of what the agents subjectively wish or think or imagine or expect or need because of the objective, systemic, macroeconomic Profit Law (2014).

Systemic laws have the same methodological status as physical laws.

In the Middle Ages, physicists did not understand the pivotal phenomenon of their subject matter, viz., energy, and could not tell the difference between potential and kinetic energy.

At present, the representative economist is still at the proto-scientific level, that is, he does not understand the pivotal phenomenon of his subject matter and cannot tell what the difference between profit and income is.

You say, “Profit is just another part of income” and this proves your utter scientific incompetence.


References
Hudík, M. (2011). Why Economics is Not a Science of Behaviour. Journal of Economic Methodology, 18(2): 147–162.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014). The Profit Theory is False Since Adam Smith. What About the True Distribution Theory? SSRN Working Paper Series, 2511741: 1–23. URL

#1 Economics is NOT a social science

September 19, 2016

Critique is good, refutation is better, Paradigm Shift is best

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Why critique in economics is so important’

Blog-Reference and Blog-Reference on Sep 22

It is long known that DSGE is a failed approach, and nobody needs the critique of Romer et al., which amounts to not much more than the smarter rats abandoning the sinking ship. What is needed is a constructive idea about how to switch from the degenerated neoclassical research program to a progressive paradigm. As Blaug put it: “The moral of the story is simply this: it takes a new theory, and not just the destructive exposure of assumptions or the collection of new facts, to beat an old theory.” (1998, p. 703)

The only reason why DSGE is still around despite the fact that even its dullest proponents have realized by now that it is indefensible garbage is that Heterodoxy has failed to develop a suitable alternative: “... we may say that ... the omnipresence of a certain point of view is not a sign of excellence or an indication that the truth or part of the truth has at last been found. It is, rather, the indication of a failure of reason to find suitable alternatives which might be used to transcend an accidental intermediate stage of our knowledge.” (Feyerabend, 2004, p. 72)

Heterodoxy’s failure is due to the fact that it stands methodologically still in the Cambridge tradition of loose verbal reasoning: “For Keynes as for Post Keynesians the guiding motto is ‘it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!’” (Davidson, 1984, p. 574). #1 This contrasts with the motto of science, “it is better to be precisely right than roughly wrong!”

There is nothing to choose between failed Orthodoxy and failed Heterodoxy. Both are logically and empirically refuted. Effective critique does NOT consist of Romer’s folk-psychological crap about heroic critique and killing poor Bob; it consists of throwing false theories out of the window and incompetent scientists out of science.

As Feynman knew: “The problem is not just to say that something might be wrong, but to replace it by something ― and that is not so easy.”

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Blaug, M. (1998). Economic Theory in Retrospect. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 5th edition.
Davidson, P. (1984). Reviving Keynes’s Revolution. Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 6(4): 561–575. URL
Feyerabend, P. K. (2004). Problems of Empiricism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

#1 Marshall and the Cambridge school of plain economic gibberish


September 18, 2016

From subjective weighing of motives to objective systemic properties

Comment on Merijn Knibbe on ‘Insider critiques of neoclassical macro models’

Blog-Reference

It is long known that DSGE is a failed approach and nobody needs the insider critique of Romer et al. which amounts to not much more than the smarter rats abandoning the sinking ship. What is needed is a constructive idea about how to switch from the degenerated neoclassical research program to a progressive paradigm.

Merijn Knibbe asks: “Do I have something to add? Yes. Of the authors above, Romer is clearest ... about the fact that a scientific paradigm does not only need theory but also needs a matching system of measurement, ...” (See intro)

Yes, indeed, this was already obvious to the ancient Greeks: “Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994)

Establishing material consistency requires observation and measurement. The central economic measuring device is national accounting. From this follows that economic theory must, as a necessary condition, (i) contain as a subset those variables that appear in national accounting, and (ii), the definitions of the variables must be identical in theory and in accounting. This is currently not the case (2012) and this goes a long way to explain why economics has never risen above the proto-scientific level.

The first thing to notice is that standard economics is built upon a set of axioms that do not contain measurable variables at all.* This was already clear to Jevons: “Many will object, no doubt, that the notions which we treat in this science are incapable of any measurement. We cannot weigh, nor gauge, nor test the feelings of the mind; there is no unit of labour, or suffering, or enjoyment.” (1911, pp. 7, 10, 12)

Standard economics dealt for more than 150 years with scientific NONENTITIES: “There is no such measurable quantity as ‘value’ or ‘utility’ (with all due respect to Jevons, Walras, and others) and there is no evaluation of ‘the greatest happiness for the greatest number’ or more flatly, ― there is no such thing.” (Evans, cited in Weintraub, 2002, p. 60)

Accordingly, mathiness can be defined as the formalization of NONENTITIES which is an entirely illegitimate/senseless application of mathematics.#2

From all this follows that economics must be based on premises/axioms that contain only variables that are capable of measurement by national accounting or other measuring devices.

Because of this, the Walrasian axioms#1 have to be FULLY replaced. What is required is a Paradigm Shift and this, in turn, requires the switch from behavior-centered bottom-up, i.e. subjective microfoundations#1, to structure-centered top-down, i.e. objective macrofoundations.

The most elementary configuration of the economy consists of the household and the business sector which in turn consists initially of one giant fully integrated firm and is defined by these three objective structural axioms:
(A1) Yw=WL wage income Yw is equal to wage rate W times working hours L,
(A2) O=RL output O is equal to productivity R times working hours L,
(A3) C=PX consumption expenditure C is equal to price P times quantity bought/sold X.

The investment goods sector comes in at a later stage. So, what we have with (A1) to (A3) is the bare-bones production-consumption economy as the most elementary economic configuration. These premises are certain, true, and primary, and therefore satisfy perfectly all methodological requirements. Note (i) that unacceptable NONENTITIES like utility, maximization, or equilibrium are absent, and (ii), that Yw and C relate to national accounting while W, L, O, R, P, X have to be measured by other devices.

Human behavior, tastes, choices, or society have no durable underlying structure, but the monetary economy has one and it is given in the most elementary case by (A1) to (A3). Economics is not a behavioral or social science but a systems science. A system can be unambiguously defined and measured. All else is proto-scientific garbage.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Jevons, W. S. (1911). The Theory of Political Economy. London, Bombay, etc.: Macmillan, 4th edition. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). The Common Error of Common Sense: An Essential Rectification of the Accounting Approach. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2124415: 1–23. URL
Weintraub, E. R. (2002). How Economics Became a Mathematical Science. Durham, London: Duke University Press.

#1 Standard economics is defined by these six hardcore propositions/axioms:
HC1 There exist economic agents.
HC2 Agents have preferences over outcomes.
HC3 Agents independently optimize subject to constraints.
HC4 Choices are made in interrelated markets.
HC5 Agents have full relevant knowledge.
HC6 Observable economic outcomes are coordinated, so they must be discussed
with reference to equilibrium states. (Weintraub, 1985)

#2 See Barzilai On the Mathematical Foundations of Economic Theory.

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REPLY to Ken Zimmerman

“People who say it cannot be done should not interrupt those who are doing it.” G. B. Shaw

You can constructively contribute to the success of Heterodoxy simply by stopping to reiterate notorious methodological nonsense. Science is about logical/empirical proof/refutation. Empirical proof/refutation presupposes measurement. A central measuring device in economics is national accounting and it works with the precision of two decimal places.

In economics, the problem is NOT that measurement is hard or impossible. In fact, it is much easier and cheaper than building a measuring device like CERN. The problem is that economists of ALL colors are quite happy in the swamp between true and false where “nothing is clear and everything is possible” (Keynes). Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, and Austrian proto-scientists are pleased with the inconclusiveness of their debates and the pluralism of false theories. What they fear more than hellfire is a clear-cut empirical test and a definitive refutation of their inconsistent models. Both, orthodox and heterodox economists know very well that they cannot survive serious testing: “... suppose they did reject all theories that were empirically falsified ... Nothing would be left standing; there would be no economics.” (Hands, 2001)

In fact, there is NO economics, only cargo cult economics, and inconclusive blather.

The trouble with economics prizes

Comment on Simon Wren-Lewis on ‘Economics, DSGE and Reality: a personal story’

Blog-Reference

The trouble with economics prizes begins here: “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel”.

The keyword is science[s]. Why not simply “Bank of Sweden Prize in Economics”? The original title clearly communicates the claim that economics is a science. This claim is as old as Adam Smith/Karl Marx. But economists never lived up to the claim.

Science is well-defined by the criteria of formal and material consistency: “Research is in fact a continuous discussion of the consistency of theories: formal consistency insofar as the discussion relates to the logical cohesion of what is asserted in joint theories; material consistency insofar as the agreement of observations with theories is concerned.” (Klant, 1994)

Neither orthodox nor heterodox economics satisfies the criteria of formal and material consistency. Worse, economists have violated scientific standards since the founding fathers. There is no exception: Walrasian, Keynesian, Marxian, or Austrian economics is provably inconsistent.

There are political economics and theoretical economics. The founding fathers were straightforward people and called themselves political economists; that is, they left no doubt that their main business was agenda-pushing. Economics never really got out of political economics. In other words, theoretical economics (= science) ultimately could not fully emancipate itself from political economics (= agenda-pushing). How economics became one of the most embarrassing failures in the history of scientific thought requires a more detailed account.

Standard economics is built upon this set of foundational propositions, a.k.a. axioms: “HC1 economic agents have preferences over outcomes; HC2 agents individually optimize subject to constraints; HC3 agent choice is manifest in interrelated markets; HC4 agents have full relevant knowledge; HC5 observable outcomes are coordinated, and must be discussed with reference to  equilibrium states.” (Weintraub 1985)

Methodologically, these premises are forever unacceptable, but economists swallowed them hook, line, and sinker from Jevons/Walras/Menger onward to DSGE. The failure of methodological individualism is indisputable. The ultimate reason can be stated as an impossibility theorem: NO way leads from the explanation of individual behavior to the explanation of how the economic system works.

Because of this, the microfoundations approach has already been dead in the cradle. Methodologically, this leaves only one option. As Joan Robinson put it: “Scrap the lot and start again.”

Keynes started the macrofoundations research program in the General Theory formally as follows: “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (p. 63)

These formal foundations are conceptually and logically defective because Keynes never came to grips with profit and therefore “discarded the draft chapter dealing with it.” (Tómasson et al., 2010)

Keynes’ original blunder kicked off a chain reaction of errors/mistakes. As a result, all I=S/IS-LM models are worthless. Most importantly, Keynes’s profit conundrum remained unsolved. To this day, neither Walrasians, Keynesians, Marxians, nor Austrians have gotten profit right. As the Palgrave Dictionary puts it: “A satisfactory theory of profits is still elusive” (Desai). Because economists have no idea of the pivotal concept of their subject matter, they cannot explain how the actual economy works. No doubt, economists bear the intellectual responsibility for the social devastations of the Great Depression and other economic crises since then. Economic policy guidance has never had a sound scientific foundation. Why are economists awarded prizes and not simply thrown out of science because of manifest incompetence?

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke




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Graphic AXEC136g