December 16, 2015

It is shrinking debt which eventually explodes the market economy

Comment on David Richardson on ‘What does “too much government debt” mean in a stock-flow consistent model?’

Blog-Reference

You are right, of course, in summarizing that representative agent models are worse than dilettantish. How anybody at the IMF could ever have taken this stuff seriously is a mystery. What can be observed with the naked eye is what you call a ‘failure of the instincts of many economists and others’.

You are right, of course, to point out that Godley and Lavoie’s approach is the correct one and that every economic model has to satisfy stock-flow consistency. There can be absolutely no doubt and no discussion about this. The two well-known criteria of science are formal and material consistency.

The sad fact is that there is a logical flaw in how Godley and Lavoie define stock-flow consistency. To be precise, the fundamental error/mistake is to be found on page 8: “Over any accounting period expenditure has to be equal to income and, as a consequence in a simple model investment must be equal to savings.”

This blunder goes back to Keynes, and After-Keynesians have not realized until this very day that Keynes had messed up the formal foundations of the General Theory with this simple syllogism “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income − consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)

The fatal flaw of Keynes’s and Godley/Lavoie’s approach is that the underlying profit theory is false (2011). And it should be beyond doubt that if one gets the pivotal concept of economics wrong, all the rest of one’s theory is vacuous, to say the least. For the rectification of the accounting approach, see (2012).

From this follows that your treatment of the debt problem is not substantially better than what standard economics has delivered. The real crux of the debt problem lies in the stock-flow relationship between the change of debt (household sector and government sector) and overall profit/loss of the business sector, and that means that the market economy breaks down as soon as overall household and government sector’s debt is redeemed (2014; 2013).

The present state of economics is that neither Orthodoxy nor Heterodoxy has an idea of how the market economy works.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2012). The Common Error of Common Sense: An Essential Rectification of the Accounting Approach. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2124415: 1–23. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2013). Redemption and Depression. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2343561: 1–28. URL
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2014). Mathematical Proof of the Breakdown of Capitalism. SSRN Working Paper Series, 2375578: 1–21. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

For details of the big picture, see cross-references Refutation I=S.

For more about stock-flow consistency, see AXECquery.

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ADDENDUM  The brain-dead blunder with profit; comment on Nick Edmonds on ‘An SFC Version of the Diamond Growth Model’ on Dec 17

Your profit equation (6) is false, and because profit is the pivotal concept in economics, it holds without exception: if profit is ill-defined, the whole theoretical superstructure falls apart.

For details, see the related comment on David R. Richardson’s RWER No 73 article ‘What does “too much government debt” mean in a stock-flow consistent model?’ here.

For the comprehensive critique of the ubiquitous profit blunder and its final rectification, see How the intelligent non-economist can refute every economist hands down.

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REPLY  Urgent: your methodological check-up; reply to Nick Edmonds on Dec 18

You maintain: “You can’t say it’s false, because it’s no more than a definition.” This is what Humpty Dumpty always said — and it is pure methodological nonsense. See The Humpty Dumpty methodology and Humpty Dumpty is back again.

There is no such thing as freedom of definition. This freedom is restricted by the requirement of consistency. Logical consistency, though, has never been a strong point of economists. For more on scientific incompetence, see cross-references Scientific Incompetence.

So, indeed, I can say it is false because it is provably false. No room for the usual wish-wash.

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REPLY  to Nick Edmonds on Dec 19

The common usage, including SNA, is provably false as demonstrated in The Common Error of Common Sense: An Essential Rectification of the Accounting Approach.

Your appeal to authority is beside the point. The fact of the matter is that ‘the EC, the IMF, the OECD, the UN, and the World Bank’ employ Humpty Dumpty economists who even messed up the elementary mathematics of accounting. Ever wondered why economics never got above the level of silly model bricolage?

December 15, 2015

Nothing to choose

Comment on Lars Syll on ‘Dani Rodrik’s smorgasbord view of economic models’

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Dani Rodrik repackages and recycles the orthodox approach which is known to be logically and materially inconsistent.*

This is standard operation procedure and would not be remarkable except for the fact that Heterodoxy recycles since more than 70 years Keynes’s approach which is also known to be logically and materially inconsistent (2011).

Progress in economics essentially consists of putting from time to time a new face on old crap. New marketing concepts and more fancy graphics for illiterate students, though, should not be confounded with New Economic Thinking.

Mirowski once put it nicely: “If this was New Thinking, one trembles to contemplate what Old Thinking had looked like.” (2013, p. 160)

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Mirowski, P. (2013). Never Let a Serious Crisis Go to Waste. London, New York, NY: Verso.

* See ‘How economists became the scientific laughing stock’
* See ‘Is Keynes acceptable?’

Useful idiots and poor scientists

Comment on Fred Welfare on ‘Dani Rodrik’s smorgasbord view of economic models’

Blog-Reference

You say “Models should be evaluated on the basis of their usefulness.”

Economists are the champions of use-value and utility maximization. This explains why they have never produced anything of scientific value.

“True science is distinctively the study of useless things. For the useful things will get studied without the aid of scientific men. To employ these rare minds on such work is like running a steam engine by burning diamonds.” (Peirce, 1931, 1.76)

Scientific thinking is guided by the criterion true/false and nothing else. Usefulness is only a good argument for selling mothballs and models.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Peirce, C. S. (1931). Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, volume I. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. URL

For details of the bigger picture see cross-references Scientific Incompetence.

December 14, 2015

Monetary policy: no sound theoretical foundation

Comment on Ann Pettifor on ‘Central bank policy rates and the real economy’

Blog-Reference

That Lawrence Summer’s theory of the “neutral rate of interest” cannot be taken seriously goes without saying. The crux of the matter is that the Keynesian alternative is not much better.

After-Keynesians have not realized until this very day that Keynes had messed up the formal foundations of the General Theory which is given with this two-liner “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income - consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)

The fatal flaw of Keynesianism is that the underlying profit theory is false (2011). And it should be beyond any doubt that if one gets the foundational concept of economics wrong all the rest of one’s theory is vacuous. From this follows that Keynesian policy proposals have no sound theoretical foundation — just like neoclassical policy advice.

A recent discussion of the theory of interest on David Glasner’s blog Uneasy Money focused on these issues: Keynes and Accounting Identities, Keynes on the Theory of Interest, The Well-Defined, but Nearly Useless, Natural Rate of Interest, Thinking about Interest and Irving Fisher. For my posts see also here


You conclude: “Until Keynes’s understanding of monetary theory and his associated policies are revived, central bank impotence will continue to be a feature of financial crises.”

There is absolutely no need to revive a logically and materially inconsistent approach. This cannot cure central bank impotence which is the very consequence of the scientific incompetence of economists of all stripes.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

December 13, 2015

History and the identity problem of economics

Comment on Peter Radford on ‘History and Economics’

Blog-Reference

Peter Radford summarizes, “Sorting all that out is what historians do well. Rediscovering the past is hard work. It is a lot more difficult than developing rational choice theory for instance. The one has to deal with ambiguities or uncertainties and tease them apart. The other simply assume them away.
Richer economics has room for both. It is after all about the behavior of human beings.”

Economics is not at all about the behavior of human beings. Psychology and Sociology are about the behavior of human beings. #1 Economics is about the behavior of the economy.

Economics is not a social science like sociology nor a natural science like physics, but a systems science.

Neither orthodox nor heterodox economists got this point. Rational choice theory, for example, is not economics at all; it is a scary example of amateur psychology.

The blatant methodological blunder of Orthodoxy consists of taking the green cheese behavioral assumption of constrained optimization into the set of foundational propositions, aka axioms. Because of this, the whole neoclassical axiom set is untenable, and this explodes the whole theoretical superstructure. #2

Because economics is not a social science, no behavioral assumption must appear in the foundational propositions of economics (Hudík, 2011). The explanation for the manifest lack of success of Heterodoxy in replacing Orthodoxy is that it suffers from the social science delusion, just like Orthodoxy.

The second delusion is that history deals with plain facts while theory takes place in some Platonic parallel universe. Suffice it to remind oneself that historians could not establish beyond a reasonable doubt in more than 2300 years whether Jesus existed or not. As a matter of fact, history consists largely of pointless speculation about NONENTITIES and NONEVENTS. Not to forget that historians have devoted and still devote a considerable part of their ingenuity and energy to the production of ‘historical facts’.

If Peter Radford means by “A richer economics has room for both” that waffling about utility maximization and storytelling about the Medicis and medieval banking can coexist, then he is in full accordance with experience. If he means by richness more scientific knowledge about the actual economy, then he is certainly mistaken.

It is a historical fact that, taken as a whole, historical reality as uncovered/produced by historians is less real than theoretical reality as uncovered/produced by scientists.

The role of history is to gather the facts and the data that are necessary for testing economic theories. To lecture about economic methodology is not the historian's job.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Hudík, M. (2011). Why Economics is Not a Science of Behaviour. Journal of Economic Methodology, 18(2): 147–162.

#1 PsySoc— the scourge of economics and The Science-of-Man fallacy and From PsySoc to SysHum
#2 How economists became the scientific laughing stock

Neither impressive nor hopeful

Comment on Lars Syll of Dec 6 on ‘The model of all economic models’

Blog-Reference

Everybody easily agrees that the statement “Lars Syll is a green Martian living in New York” is false and that the statement “Lars Syll is a green Martian living in Malmö” is not a very impressive improvement. But “Lars Syll is a confused economist living in Malmö” is a correct assertion.

Everybody easily agrees that Lars Syll’s critique of standard economics is valid and that all models from Jevons/Walras/Menger to DSGE that take the ‘maximization-and-equilibrium world as a starting point’ are provable false.#1 The methodological incompetence of neoclassical economists consists in not recognizing that the axiomatic foundations of their Ur-Model are indefensible.

Thus far the matter is settled, now the hard part starts with finding an alternative because Keynesianism as the challenger of neoclassics is also defective and untenable.

The fact of the matter is that all authors who have written about Keynes, this includes Lars Syll#2, have overlooked that Keynes had messed up the formal foundation of the General Theory which is given with this two-liner “Income = value of output = consumption + investment. Saving = income - consumption. Therefore saving = investment.” (1973, p. 63)#3

The fatal flaw of Keynesianism is that the underlying profit theory is false. And it should be beyond the slightest doubt that if one gets the pivotal concept of economics wrong all the rest of one’s theory is for the birds. From this follows that Keynesian policy proposals have no sound theoretical foundation — just like neoclassical policy advice.

Science is defined by material and logical consistency. Not to realize the logical inconsistency in the elementary formalism of Keynesianism is a reliable indicator of scientific incompetence.

The state of economics is this: Orthodoxy is methodologically forever unacceptable but what Heterodoxy has delivered until now is ‘not very impressive or hopeful.’

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Keynes, J. M. (1973). The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money. The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes Vol. VII. London, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

#1 Scientific Cave men with a daunting message and ‘The U-Blunder of economics and its rectification and How economists became the scientific laughing stock
#2 See Book
#3 For details of the big picture see cross-references Refutation of I=S

December 12, 2015

Methodological kindergarten

Comment on Nanikore of Dec 9 on ‘Using models’

Blog-Reference

You say: “Keynes criticised ‘pretty and polite techniques’.” And rightly so, indeed, but Keynes and the After-Keynesians in turn have to be criticized for not having a firm grasp of scientific methodology. To be more precise, Keynes was a political economist and not a theoretical economist. The political economist is an agenda pusher and interested in theory only so far as it serves his agenda. #1

“I consider that Keynes had no real grasp of formal economic theorizing (and also disliked it) and that he consequently left many gaping holes in his theory.” (Hahn, 1982, p. x)

The largest hole in Keynesianism is that the profit theory is false. #2 And it should be beyond the slightest doubt that if one gets the pivotal concept of economics wrong, all the rest of one’s theory is for the birds. The methodological incompetence of After-Keynesians is documented by the fact that they did not spot Keynes’s fatal logical blunder until this day (2011). From this follows that Keynesian policy proposals have no sound theoretical foundation. Keynesianism is commonsensical storytelling, and that is enough for agenda pushing.

Keynesians insist that ontological uncertainty has been Keynes’s profound methodological insight. Think twice: this is blown-up taxi-driver wisdom, and the famous “We simply do not know” while obviously true, is not exactly an interesting contribution to scientific progress. On the contrary, this correct self-description of Keynesians gives them sufficient reason to look for a more productive occupation.

With regard to methodology, you also say that ‘Keynes and Friedman actually agreed’. This proves nothing. Both Keynes and Friedman were political economists, and what they uttered about methodology is either garbage or trivial. You can be quite sure that neither of the two will ever be accepted as a scientist — except perhaps by the delusional members of their respective sects.

To quote Keynes on scientific matters or to reiterate the silly Keynesian slogan ‘Better roughly right than precisely wrong’ is self-disqualifying.

Egmont Kakarot-Handtke


References
Hahn, F. H. (1982). Money and Inflation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Kakarot-Handtke, E. (2011). Why Post Keynesianism is Not Yet a Science. SSRN Working Paper Series, 1966438: 1–20. URL

#1 How economists became the scientific laughing stock
#2 Fundamentally flawed

Related 'Swedish muddle'