Abstract In a programmatic article Alfred Eichner explained, from a Post Keynesian perspective, why neoclassical economics is not yet a science. This was some time ago and one would expect that Post Keynesianism, with a heightened awareness of scientific standards, has done much better than alternative approaches in the meantime. There is wide agreement that this is not the case. Explanations, though, differ widely. The present – strictly formal – inquiry identifies an elementary logical flaw. This strengthens the argument that the Post Keynesian motto ‘it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!’ is methodologically indefensible.
March 15, 2013
Why Post Keynesianism is not yet a science {23b}
Abstract In a programmatic article Alfred Eichner explained, from a Post Keynesian perspective, why neoclassical economics is not yet a science. This was some time ago and one would expect that Post Keynesianism, with a heightened awareness of scientific standards, has done much better than alternative approaches in the meantime. There is wide agreement that this is not the case. Explanations, though, differ widely. The present – strictly formal – inquiry identifies an elementary logical flaw. This strengthens the argument that the Post Keynesian motto ‘it is better to be roughly right than precisely wrong!’ is methodologically indefensible.
March 11, 2013
The calculating auctioneer, enlightened wage setters, and the fingers of the Invisible Hand {40}
Working paper at SSRN
Working paper at ARCHIVE
Abstract The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epitomize the interdependence of real and nominal variables that constitutes the monetary economy. This is a cogent conclusion from the persistent collapse of behavioral and real models. Conceptual rigor demands, first, to take objective-structural axioms as a formal point of departure and, secondly, to clarify the interrelations of the fundamental concepts of income and profit. The present paper reconstructs the characteristic properties of a Walrasian economy in structural axiomatic terms, generalizes them, and explores the consequences for our understanding of the working of the economy we happen to live in.
Abstract The formal foundations of theoretical economics must be nonbehavioral and epitomize the interdependence of real and nominal variables that constitutes the monetary economy. This is a cogent conclusion from the persistent collapse of behavioral and real models. Conceptual rigor demands, first, to take objective-structural axioms as a formal point of departure and, secondly, to clarify the interrelations of the fundamental concepts of income and profit. The present paper reconstructs the characteristic properties of a Walrasian economy in structural axiomatic terms, generalizes them, and explores the consequences for our understanding of the working of the economy we happen to live in.
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